//! Subagent-level tool gating (mirrors Harness checks).
//!
//! Flow: always blocks dangerous patterns — path traversal, stub/denial/
//! assumption language, bash exfiltration, destructive commands, sensitive
//! path reads — regardless of the allowed-tools list. Tools that are not
//! risky only get the basic allowlist check.
//!
//! Security: subagent tool gating mirrors the main agent's `Guard` checks
//! (path traversal, reason validation, stub/denial/assumption scanning,
//! bash exfiltration and destructive-pattern detection) so that subagents
//! are not a weaker link than the main agent.

use crate::app::guard::patterns::{
    ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS, DENIAL_PATTERNS, EXFIL_PATTERNS, MIN_REASON_LEN, SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS,
    STUB_PATTERNS,
};

/// Gate a tool call in the subagent context. Returns `Some(block_reason)` if
/// the call should be blocked, `None` to allow.
pub(crate) fn gate_subagent_tool_call(
    tool_name: &str,
    args: &serde_json::Value,
) -> Option<String> {
    // File-mutating tools: write / edit / delete
    if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
        if let Some(path) = args.get("path").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
            if path.contains("..") {
                return Some("path traversal detected in 'path' argument".to_string());
            }
        }
    }

    // write / edit / delete require a non-trivial `reason`
    if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
        let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
        if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
            return Some(format!(
                "{tool_name} requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= {MIN_REASON_LEN} chars) explaining why",
            ));
        }
    }

    // write / edit content must not contain stubs, denial, or assumption language
    if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit") {
        let content = match tool_name {
            "write" => args.get("content").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
            "edit" => {
                let old = args.get("old").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
                let new = args.get("new").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
                // For edits, scanning old+new together catches stubs in both
                return if contains_any(old, STUB_PATTERNS)
                    || contains_any(new, STUB_PATTERNS)
                {
                    Some(
                        "content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented"
                            .to_string(),
                    )
                } else if contains_any(new, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
                    Some(
                        "content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping"
                            .to_string(),
                    )
                } else if contains_any(new, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
                    Some(
                        "content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing"
                            .to_string(),
                    )
                } else {
                    return None;
                };
            }
            _ => "",
        };
        if contains_any(content, STUB_PATTERNS) {
            return Some(
                "content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented"
                    .to_string(),
            );
        }
        if contains_any(content, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
            return Some(
                "content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping"
                    .to_string(),
            );
        }
        if contains_any(content, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
            return Some(
                "content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing"
                    .to_string(),
            );
        }
    }

    // Bash: exfiltration, sensitive paths, destructive commands
    if tool_name == "bash" {
        let cmd = args.get("command").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
        if cmd.contains("..") {
            return Some("path traversal detected in bash command".to_string());
        }
        // Only check exfiltration for non-standard commands
        let is_standard = cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cargo")
            || cmd.trim_start().starts_with("rustc")
            || cmd.trim_start().starts_with("git ")
            || cmd.trim_start().starts_with("ls")
            || cmd.trim_start().starts_with("pwd")
            || cmd.trim_start().starts_with("echo")
            || cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cat")
            || cmd.trim_start().starts_with("find")
            || cmd.trim_start().starts_with("grep")
            || cmd.trim_start().starts_with("test");
        if !is_standard {
            for pat in EXFIL_PATTERNS {
                if cmd.contains(pat) {
                    return Some(format!(
                        "potential data-exfiltration command blocked (matched '{pat}')"
                    ));
                }
            }
        }
        for pat in SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS {
            if cmd.contains(pat) {
                return Some(format!("refused to read/write sensitive path '{pat}'"));
            }
        }
        let dangerous = [
            "rm -rf /",
            "rm -rf --no-preserve-root",
            "rm -rf ~",
            "rm -fr /",
            "mkfs.",
            "dd if=",
            ":(){",
            "> /dev/sda",
            "chmod -R 000 /",
            "shutdown ",
            "poweroff ",
            "reboot ",
            "halt ",
        ];
        for pat in &dangerous {
            if cmd.contains(pat) {
                return Some(format!("destructive command pattern blocked: {pat}"));
            }
        }
        if contains_any(cmd, STUB_PATTERNS) {
            return Some("bash command contains stub pattern".to_string());
        }
    }

    // git_operator: require reason
    if tool_name == "git_operator" {
        let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
        if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
            return Some("git_operator requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= 8 chars)".to_string());
        }
    }

    None
}

/// Check if `text` matches any pattern (case-insensitive substring).
pub(crate) fn contains_any(text: &str, patterns: &[&str]) -> bool {
    let lower = text.to_lowercase();
    patterns.iter().any(|p| lower.contains(&p.to_lowercase()))
}