refactor: massive codebase restructuring — naming, splitting, DRY

Crate renames:
  - zesdex-entities::seaorm → domain (misleading name, no SeaORM used)
  - zesdex-dto → merged into zesdex-entities (100% re-exports)
  - zesdex-libs → zesdex-infra (vague name)

Module renames:
  - app/harness → guard (misleading: safety gatekeeper, not test harness)
  - runtime/commands → action_dispatch (name clashed with controller/command)
  - resources → prompts (embedded prompt text, not general resources)
  - tool/seqthink → sequential_think (unreadable abbreviation)
  - msglog/query → insert (module only inserts, never queries)

Dead code removal:
  - app/mode/help.rs (orphaned — not declared in mod.rs)
  - app/mode/loading.rs (orphaned — not declared in mod.rs)

File splitting (71 new files, avg ~115 lines/file):
  - app/runtime/actions/: 1→8 files (was 2030 lines)
  - view/overlays/: 1→16 files (was 1167 lines)
  - tool/lsp/: 1→8 per-tool files (was 909 lines)
  - main.rs: 1→5 files (session, daemon, attach, event_loop)
  - workflow/engine + hive_mind: 2→10 files
  - subagent/engine + auto: 2→9 files
  - lsp/provisioner: 1→5 files
  - review/: 1→6 files
  - guard/: 1→2 files (extracted patterns)
  - state/misc: 1→3 files (input, scroll)
  - mcp/: 1→3 files (transport, adapter)
  - stream/json_repair extracted from turn.rs

DRY:
  - Pattern constants (STUB_PATTERNS etc) in guard/patterns shared with subagent
  - 3 near-identical background spawners → 1 generic + thin wrappers
  - Shared spawn_subagent_with_drain() extracted
  - Shared create_session() in main
  - write_osc52 deduplicated

Bug fixes:
  - archive_message(): sess.db → db (wrong variable name)
  - execute_one_tool(): wrong parameter name
  - check_credential_read() function was missing (restored from test expectations)
This commit is contained in:
asepharyana
2026-07-17 09:08:41 +07:00
parent 1f0ae9f551
commit 9a67137954
139 changed files with 9704 additions and 8858 deletions
@@ -15,32 +15,21 @@
//! wrote this file, let me check if it's correct before continuing").
//! - Background reviews catch broader concerns (missing tests, architectural
//! drift, security issues) without blocking the main agent's flow.
pub(crate) mod paths;
pub use paths::is_reviewable_path;
pub(crate) use paths::is_production_code;
use crate::app::state::runtime::TurnEvent;
use crate::app::subagent::context::build_subagent_context;
use crate::app::subagent::engine::run_subagent;
use crate::app::subagent::event::SubagentEvent;
use crate::app::subagent::spawn::AgentDefinition;
use crate::app::subagent::spawn::{spawn_subagent_with_drain, AgentDefinition};
use std::collections::VecDeque;
use std::path::Path;
use std::sync::atomic::{AtomicBool, Ordering};
use std::sync::{Arc, Mutex};
/// File extensions that should not trigger auto-review (config, lock, data).
const SKIP_REVIEW_EXTENSIONS: &[&str] = &[
".lock", ".md", ".txt", ".json", ".toml", ".yaml", ".yml", ".svg", ".png", ".jpg", ".ico",
".woff", ".woff2",
];
/// File names that should not trigger auto-review.
const SKIP_REVIEW_FILES: &[&str] = &[
"Cargo.lock",
"yarn.lock",
"package-lock.json",
".gitignore",
".env",
".env.example",
];
/// Prevents a second background subagent of the same kind from spawning
/// while one is already in flight. Without this, a chatty multi-turn edit
/// session could stack overlapping test-gen/arch/security reviews of
@@ -64,97 +53,24 @@ impl Drop for RunningGuard {
}
/// ─── Helpers ───
/// Derive a human-readable message prefix from the internal kind label.
/// Derive a human-readable message prefix from the internal kind label.
///
/// Check whether a file path is worth auto-reviewing (not config/lock/data).
///
/// Vendored/generated directories are matched by path *segment* rather than
/// a `/target/`-style substring check — the substring form misses paths
/// where the directory is the first component (e.g. `target/debug/build.rs`,
/// which has no leading slash), the same class of bug fixed in
/// `is_production_code` below.
pub fn is_reviewable_path(path: &str) -> bool {
let lower = path.to_lowercase();
if SKIP_REVIEW_FILES.iter().any(|f| lower.ends_with(f)) {
return false;
/// Production callers always pass one of the three known labels
/// (`"bg-test-gen"`, `"bg-arch-review"`, `"bg-security-review"`).
fn message_prefix(kind: &str) -> &'static str {
match kind {
"bg-test-gen" => "Auto test-gen",
"bg-arch-review" => "Architecture review",
"bg-security-review" => "Security review",
other => {
// Production callers always use one of the three known labels.
// This path is a safety net only.
debug_assert!(false, "unknown background review kind: {other}");
""
}
}
if SKIP_REVIEW_EXTENSIONS.iter().any(|e| lower.ends_with(e)) {
return false;
}
// Skip paths that are clearly generated or vendored
let in_vendored_dir = std::path::Path::new(&lower).components().any(|c| {
matches!(
c,
std::path::Component::Normal(seg)
if matches!(seg.to_str(), Some("target" | "node_modules" | ".git" | "vendor"))
)
});
if in_vendored_dir {
return false;
}
true
}
/// Determine whether a file change looks like it modifies production logic
/// (vs. tests, config, or documentation) — used to decide if a test-gen
/// or security-review background subagent should fire.
///
/// Matches test-ness by path *segment* (a directory literally named
/// "test"/"tests"/"__tests__") or by filename convention
/// (`foo_test.rs`, `foo.test.ts`, `test_foo.py`, `foo_spec.rb`), not by a
/// raw substring check — a plain `.contains("test")` would wrongly exclude
/// legitimate production files like `src/attestation.rs` or
/// `src/latest/foo.rs`.
fn is_production_code(path: &str) -> bool {
let lower = path.to_lowercase();
let path_obj = std::path::Path::new(&lower);
let in_test_dir = path_obj.components().any(|c| {
matches!(
c,
std::path::Component::Normal(seg)
if matches!(seg.to_str(), Some("test" | "tests" | "__tests__"))
)
});
let file_stem = path_obj.file_stem().and_then(|s| s.to_str()).unwrap_or("");
let is_test_filename = file_stem.starts_with("test_")
|| file_stem.ends_with("_test")
|| std::path::Path::new(file_stem)
.extension()
.is_some_and(|ext| ext.eq_ignore_ascii_case("test"))
|| file_stem == "spec"
|| file_stem.ends_with("_spec")
|| std::path::Path::new(file_stem)
.extension()
.is_some_and(|ext| ext.eq_ignore_ascii_case("spec"));
if in_test_dir || is_test_filename {
return false;
}
// Only source files — use Path::extension() to avoid clippy
// case_sensitive_file_extension_comparisons lint
path_obj
.extension()
.and_then(|ext| ext.to_str())
.is_some_and(|ext| {
matches!(
ext,
"rs" | "ts"
| "tsx"
| "js"
| "jsx"
| "go"
| "py"
| "java"
| "kt"
| "swift"
| "c"
| "cpp"
| "h"
| "hpp"
)
})
}
/// ─── Inline Quick Review (synchronous, feeds back to LLM) ───
@@ -177,7 +93,7 @@ pub fn spawn_quick_review(
) -> anyhow::Result<String> {
let prompt = format!(
"{}\n\nFile to review: {}",
crate::resources::AUTO_REVIEWER_PROMPT,
crate::prompts::AUTO_REVIEWER_PROMPT,
file_path,
);
@@ -188,21 +104,18 @@ pub fn spawn_quick_review(
ctx.session_dir = session_dir.to_path_buf();
ctx.workspaces = workspaces.to_vec();
let (tx, mut rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(32);
let _drain = std::thread::spawn(move || {
while let Some(event) = rx.blocking_recv() {
match &event {
SubagentEvent::ToolCall { tool, .. } => {
tracing::debug!("[auto-review] tool call: {}", tool);
}
SubagentEvent::ToolResult { tool, .. } => {
tracing::debug!("[auto-review] tool result: {}", tool);
}
SubagentEvent::Completed => {
tracing::debug!("[auto-review] completed");
}
_ => {}
let (tx, _drain) = spawn_subagent_with_drain(|event| {
match &event {
SubagentEvent::ToolCall { tool, .. } => {
tracing::debug!("[auto-review] tool call: {}", tool);
}
SubagentEvent::ToolResult { tool, .. } => {
tracing::debug!("[auto-review] tool result: {}", tool);
}
SubagentEvent::Completed => {
tracing::debug!("[auto-review] completed");
}
_ => {}
}
});
@@ -247,13 +160,10 @@ fn run_subagent_with_retry(
ctx.workspaces = workspaces.to_vec();
ctx.abort_flag = abort_flag.cloned();
let (tx, mut rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(32);
let drain_label = label.to_string();
let _drain = std::thread::spawn(move || {
while let Some(event) = rx.blocking_recv() {
if let SubagentEvent::StepFailed { step, error } = &event {
tracing::warn!("[{drain_label}] step {step} failed: {error}");
}
let (tx, _drain) = spawn_subagent_with_drain(move |event| {
if let SubagentEvent::StepFailed { step, error } = &event {
tracing::warn!("[{drain_label}] step {step} failed: {error}");
}
});
@@ -268,6 +178,76 @@ fn run_subagent_with_retry(
Err(format!("failed after 2 attempts: {last_err}"))
}
/// ─── Generic background review spawner ───
///
/// Runs a subagent in a background OS thread, gated by `running_flag` so
/// only one instance of a given kind can be in flight at a time. Reports
/// completion via a `TurnEvent::SystemNote` pushed to `turn_events`.
///
/// `kind` is the internal label used for logging and the `SystemNote` kind
/// (e.g. `"bg-test-gen"`, `"bg-arch-review"`). The human-readable message
/// prefix is derived from this label via [`message_prefix`].
fn spawn_background_review(
kind: &str,
running_flag: &'static AtomicBool,
prompt_constant: &str,
agent_name: &str,
agent_role: &str,
file_paths: Vec<String>,
session_dir: std::path::PathBuf,
workspaces: Vec<std::path::PathBuf>,
turn_events: Arc<Mutex<VecDeque<TurnEvent>>>,
abort_flag: Arc<AtomicBool>,
) {
if file_paths.is_empty() {
return;
}
if running_flag
.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::SeqCst, Ordering::SeqCst)
.is_err()
{
tracing::debug!("[{kind}] skipped — a {kind} run is already in flight");
return;
}
let sd = session_dir;
let ws = workspaces;
let events = turn_events;
let prompt_text = format!(
"{}\n\nModified files:\n{}",
prompt_constant,
file_paths.join("\n"),
);
let label = kind.to_string();
let agent_name = agent_name.to_string();
let agent_role = agent_role.to_string();
let prefix = message_prefix(kind);
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _running_guard = RunningGuard(running_flag);
tracing::info!("[{label}] spawning for {} file(s)", file_paths.len());
let def = AgentDefinition::new(agent_name, agent_role).with_system_prompt(prompt_text);
let result = run_subagent_with_retry(&def, &sd, &ws, &label, Some(&abort_flag));
let message = match &result {
Ok(output) => {
let first = output.lines().next().unwrap_or(output);
format!("{prefix}: {first}")
}
Err(e) if e.contains("aborted") => format!("{prefix} cancelled: {e}"),
Err(e) => format!("ESCALATED: {prefix} {e}"),
};
if let Ok(mut q) = events.lock() {
q.push_back(TurnEvent::SystemNote {
kind: label,
message,
});
}
});
}
/// Spawn a background subagent that generates tests for modified files.
///
/// Uses the test-generator prompt and has read-write access so it can
@@ -276,8 +256,8 @@ fn run_subagent_with_retry(
///
/// Skipped (no-op) if a test-gen run is already in flight (guarded by
/// `TEST_GEN_RUNNING`) — prevents a chatty multi-turn edit session from
/// stacking overlapping runs. `abort_flag` is forwarded to
/// `run_subagent_with_retry` so the run can be cancelled if the turn aborts.
/// stacking overlapping runs. `abort_flag` is forwarded to the generic
/// spawner so the run can be cancelled if the turn aborts.
pub fn spawn_background_test_gen(
file_paths: &[String],
session_dir: &Path,
@@ -285,60 +265,18 @@ pub fn spawn_background_test_gen(
turn_events: &Arc<Mutex<VecDeque<TurnEvent>>>,
abort_flag: Arc<AtomicBool>,
) {
if file_paths.is_empty() {
return;
}
if TEST_GEN_RUNNING
.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::SeqCst, Ordering::SeqCst)
.is_err()
{
tracing::debug!("[bg-test-gen] skipped — a test-gen run is already in flight");
return;
}
let paths = file_paths.to_vec();
let sd = session_dir.to_path_buf();
let ws = workspaces.to_vec();
let events = turn_events.clone();
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _running_guard = RunningGuard(&TEST_GEN_RUNNING);
tracing::info!(
"[bg-test-gen] spawning for {} file(s): {:?}",
paths.len(),
paths,
);
let file_list = paths.join("\n");
let prompt = format!(
"{}\n\nModified files that need tests:\n{}",
crate::resources::TEST_GENERATOR_PROMPT,
file_list,
);
let def = AgentDefinition::new(
"test-generator".to_string(),
"coder".to_string(), // needs write access
)
.with_system_prompt(prompt);
let result = run_subagent_with_retry(&def, &sd, &ws, "bg-test-gen", Some(&abort_flag));
let message = match &result {
Ok(output) => {
let first = output.lines().next().unwrap_or(output);
format!("Auto test-gen: {first}")
}
Err(e) if e.contains("aborted") => format!("Auto test-gen cancelled: {e}"),
Err(e) => format!("ESCALATED: Auto test-gen {e}"),
};
if let Ok(mut q) = events.lock() {
q.push_back(TurnEvent::SystemNote {
kind: "bg-test-gen".to_string(),
message,
});
}
});
spawn_background_review(
"bg-test-gen",
&TEST_GEN_RUNNING,
crate::prompts::TEST_GENERATOR_PROMPT,
"test-generator",
"coder",
file_paths.to_vec(),
session_dir.to_path_buf(),
workspaces.to_vec(),
turn_events.clone(),
abort_flag,
);
}
/// Spawn a background architecture-review subagent.
@@ -348,8 +286,8 @@ pub fn spawn_background_test_gen(
/// `TurnEvent::SystemNote { kind: "bg-arch-review" }`.
///
/// Skipped (no-op) if an arch-review run is already in flight (guarded by
/// `ARCH_REVIEW_RUNNING`). `abort_flag` is forwarded to
/// `run_subagent_with_retry` so the run can be cancelled if the turn aborts.
/// `ARCH_REVIEW_RUNNING`). `abort_flag` is forwarded to the generic
/// spawner so the run can be cancelled if the turn aborts.
pub fn spawn_background_arch_review(
file_paths: &[String],
session_dir: &Path,
@@ -357,51 +295,18 @@ pub fn spawn_background_arch_review(
turn_events: &Arc<Mutex<VecDeque<TurnEvent>>>,
abort_flag: Arc<AtomicBool>,
) {
if file_paths.is_empty() {
return;
}
if ARCH_REVIEW_RUNNING
.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::SeqCst, Ordering::SeqCst)
.is_err()
{
tracing::debug!("[bg-arch-review] skipped — an arch-review run is already in flight");
return;
}
let paths = file_paths.to_vec();
let sd = session_dir.to_path_buf();
let ws = workspaces.to_vec();
let events = turn_events.clone();
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _running_guard = RunningGuard(&ARCH_REVIEW_RUNNING);
let file_list = paths.join("\n");
let prompt = format!(
"{}\n\nModified files for architecture review:\n{}",
crate::resources::ARCH_REVIEWER_PROMPT,
file_list,
);
let def = AgentDefinition::new("arch-reviewer".to_string(), "reviewer".to_string())
.with_system_prompt(prompt);
let result = run_subagent_with_retry(&def, &sd, &ws, "bg-arch-review", Some(&abort_flag));
let message = match &result {
Ok(output) => {
let first = output.lines().next().unwrap_or(output);
format!("Architecture review: {first}")
}
Err(e) if e.contains("aborted") => format!("Architecture review cancelled: {e}"),
Err(e) => format!("ESCALATED: Architecture review {e}"),
};
if let Ok(mut q) = events.lock() {
q.push_back(TurnEvent::SystemNote {
kind: "bg-arch-review".to_string(),
message,
});
}
});
spawn_background_review(
"bg-arch-review",
&ARCH_REVIEW_RUNNING,
crate::prompts::ARCH_REVIEWER_PROMPT,
"arch-reviewer",
"reviewer",
file_paths.to_vec(),
session_dir.to_path_buf(),
workspaces.to_vec(),
turn_events.clone(),
abort_flag,
);
}
/// Spawn a background security-review subagent.
@@ -409,9 +314,12 @@ pub fn spawn_background_arch_review(
/// Checks modified files for security vulnerabilities. Reports via
/// `TurnEvent::SystemNote { kind: "bg-security-review" }`.
///
/// Only reviews production code files for security — test files and
/// config files are out of scope for security review.
///
/// Skipped (no-op) if a security-review run is already in flight (guarded by
/// `SECURITY_REVIEW_RUNNING`). `abort_flag` is forwarded to
/// `run_subagent_with_retry` so the run can be cancelled if the turn aborts.
/// `SECURITY_REVIEW_RUNNING`). `abort_flag` is forwarded to the generic
/// spawner so the run can be cancelled if the turn aborts.
pub fn spawn_background_security_review(
file_paths: &[String],
session_dir: &Path,
@@ -419,10 +327,6 @@ pub fn spawn_background_security_review(
turn_events: &Arc<Mutex<VecDeque<TurnEvent>>>,
abort_flag: Arc<AtomicBool>,
) {
if file_paths.is_empty() {
return;
}
// Only review production code files for security — test files and
// config files are out of scope for security review.
let prod_paths: Vec<String> = file_paths
@@ -431,54 +335,18 @@ pub fn spawn_background_security_review(
.cloned()
.collect();
if prod_paths.is_empty() {
return;
}
if SECURITY_REVIEW_RUNNING
.compare_exchange(false, true, Ordering::SeqCst, Ordering::SeqCst)
.is_err()
{
tracing::debug!(
"[bg-security-review] skipped — a security-review run is already in flight"
);
return;
}
let paths = prod_paths;
let sd = session_dir.to_path_buf();
let ws = workspaces.to_vec();
let events = turn_events.clone();
std::thread::spawn(move || {
let _running_guard = RunningGuard(&SECURITY_REVIEW_RUNNING);
let file_list = paths.join("\n");
let prompt = format!(
"{}\n\nModified files for security review:\n{}",
crate::resources::SECURITY_REVIEWER_PROMPT,
file_list,
);
let def = AgentDefinition::new("security-reviewer".to_string(), "reviewer".to_string())
.with_system_prompt(prompt);
let result =
run_subagent_with_retry(&def, &sd, &ws, "bg-security-review", Some(&abort_flag));
let message = match &result {
Ok(output) => {
let first = output.lines().next().unwrap_or(output);
format!("Security review: {first}")
}
Err(e) if e.contains("aborted") => format!("Security review cancelled: {e}"),
Err(e) => format!("ESCALATED: Security review {e}"),
};
if let Ok(mut q) = events.lock() {
q.push_back(TurnEvent::SystemNote {
kind: "bg-security-review".to_string(),
message,
});
}
});
spawn_background_review(
"bg-security-review",
&SECURITY_REVIEW_RUNNING,
crate::prompts::SECURITY_REVIEWER_PROMPT,
"security-reviewer",
"reviewer",
prod_paths,
session_dir.to_path_buf(),
workspaces.to_vec(),
turn_events.clone(),
abort_flag,
);
}
/// Convenience: spawn all applicable background subagents for a set of edited
@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
//! Path classification helpers for auto-subagent orchestration.
//!
//! Determines whether a file path is reviewable and whether it represents
//! production code (vs. tests, config, or documentation) — used to decide
//! which background subagents should fire for a given set of modified files.
/// File extensions that should not trigger auto-review (config, lock, data).
pub(crate) const SKIP_REVIEW_EXTENSIONS: &[&str] = &[
".lock",
".md",
".txt",
".json",
".toml",
".yaml",
".yml",
".svg",
".png",
".jpg",
".ico",
".woff",
".woff2",
];
/// File names that should not trigger auto-review.
pub(crate) const SKIP_REVIEW_FILES: &[&str] = &[
"Cargo.lock",
"yarn.lock",
"package-lock.json",
".gitignore",
".env",
".env.example",
];
/// Check whether a file path is worth auto-reviewing (not config/lock/data).
///
/// Vendored/generated directories are matched by path *segment* rather than
/// a `/target/`-style substring check — the substring form misses paths
/// where the directory is the first component (e.g. `target/debug/build.rs`,
/// which has no leading slash), the same class of bug fixed in
/// `is_production_code` below.
pub fn is_reviewable_path(path: &str) -> bool {
let lower = path.to_lowercase();
if SKIP_REVIEW_FILES.iter().any(|f| lower.ends_with(f)) {
return false;
}
if SKIP_REVIEW_EXTENSIONS.iter().any(|e| lower.ends_with(e)) {
return false;
}
// Skip paths that are clearly generated or vendored
let in_vendored_dir = std::path::Path::new(&lower).components().any(|c| {
matches!(
c,
std::path::Component::Normal(seg)
if matches!(seg.to_str(), Some("target" | "node_modules" | ".git" | "vendor"))
)
});
if in_vendored_dir {
return false;
}
true
}
/// Determine whether a file change looks like it modifies production logic
/// (vs. tests, config, or documentation) — used to decide if a test-gen
/// or security-review background subagent should fire.
///
/// Matches test-ness by path *segment* (a directory literally named
/// "test"/"tests"/"__tests__") or by filename convention
/// (`foo_test.rs`, `foo.test.ts`, `test_foo.py`, `foo_spec.rb`), not by a
/// raw substring check — a plain `.contains("test")` would wrongly exclude
/// legitimate production files like `src/attestation.rs` or
/// `src/latest/foo.rs`.
pub(crate) fn is_production_code(path: &str) -> bool {
let lower = path.to_lowercase();
let path_obj = std::path::Path::new(&lower);
let in_test_dir = path_obj.components().any(|c| {
matches!(
c,
std::path::Component::Normal(seg)
if matches!(seg.to_str(), Some("test" | "tests" | "__tests__"))
)
});
let file_stem = path_obj.file_stem().and_then(|s| s.to_str()).unwrap_or("");
let is_test_filename = file_stem.starts_with("test_")
|| file_stem.ends_with("_test")
|| std::path::Path::new(file_stem)
.extension()
.is_some_and(|ext| ext.eq_ignore_ascii_case("test"))
|| file_stem == "spec"
|| file_stem.ends_with("_spec")
|| std::path::Path::new(file_stem)
.extension()
.is_some_and(|ext| ext.eq_ignore_ascii_case("spec"));
if in_test_dir || is_test_filename {
return false;
}
// Only source files — use Path::extension() to avoid clippy
// case_sensitive_file_extension_comparisons lint
path_obj
.extension()
.and_then(|ext| ext.to_str())
.is_some_and(|ext| {
matches!(
ext,
"rs" | "ts"
| "tsx"
| "js"
| "jsx"
| "go"
| "py"
| "java"
| "kt"
| "swift"
| "c"
| "cpp"
| "h"
| "hpp"
)
})
}
+10 -388
View File
@@ -1,384 +1,22 @@
//! Subagent execution loop: drive an LLM conversation, gate tool calls
//! against the context's allowlist, run tools, and stream progress events
//! to the parent via an mpsc channel.
//! Subagent execution loop: drive an LLM conversation, run tools, and stream
//! progress events to the parent via an mpsc channel.
//!
//! Security: subagent tool gating mirrors the main agent's `Harness` checks
//! (path traversal, reason validation, stub/denial/assumption scanning,
//! bash exfiltration and destructive-pattern detection) so that subagents
//! are not a weaker link than the main agent.
//! Tool gating and pattern-constant definitions live in sibling modules
//! (`gating`, `provider`, `tools`, `workspace`) rather than here, so each
//! concern is independently testable and maintainable.
use super::context::SubagentContext;
use super::event::SubagentEvent;
use super::gating::gate_subagent_tool_call;
use super::provider::{require_api_key, resolve_provider_config};
use super::tools::build_subagent_tools;
use super::workspace::generate_workspace_tree;
use crate::dto::chat::message::ChatMessage;
use crate::dto::provider::request::ToolDef;
use crate::tool::{all_tools, tool_defs, tool_is_risky};
use crate::tool::tool_is_risky;
use sha2::Digest;
use std::fmt::Write;
use tokio::sync::mpsc;
use zesdex_cms::domain::repository::AppConfigRepository;
use zesdex_cms::domain::repository::EditLogRepository;
use zesdex_cms::domain::repository::SettingsRepository;
/// Maps a subagent's allowed tool names to concrete Tool trait objects and
/// OpenAI-style tool definitions.
///
/// Flow: load `all_tools()` → if `allowed_tools` is empty, use all; else
/// filter by membership → derive `ToolDef`s for the LLM.
///
/// Why: an empty allowlist means "no restriction" (matches
/// `build_subagent_context`'s default for non-reviewer roles).
///
/// Return: `(tool impls, schema defs)` for the subagent to use.
fn build_subagent_tools(
allowed_tools: &[String],
) -> (Vec<Box<dyn crate::tool::Tool>>, Vec<ToolDef>) {
let all = all_tools();
let filtered: Vec<Box<dyn crate::tool::Tool>> = if allowed_tools.is_empty() {
all.into_iter()
.filter(|t| t.name() != "hive_mind" && t.name() != "workflow_run")
.collect()
} else {
all.into_iter()
.filter(|t| {
allowed_tools.contains(&t.name().to_string())
&& t.name() != "hive_mind"
&& t.name() != "workflow_run"
})
.collect()
};
let defs = tool_defs(&filtered);
(filtered, defs)
}
/// Resolve the API key, model, and base URL from persisted app config.
///
/// Flow: try the settings key for the active provider → fall back to the
/// provider's `api_key_env` env-var → fall back to the provider's
/// `default_api_key` → fall back to an empty string.
///
/// Why: matches the main agent's credential resolution exactly, so
/// subagents automatically inherit the same provider settings.
///
/// Return: `(api_key, model, optional_base_url, provider_name)`. `api_key`
/// is empty when every resolution path was exhausted — callers must check
/// for this before issuing requests (see `run_subagent`).
fn resolve_provider_config() -> (String, String, Option<String>, String) {
let store_base_dir = zesdex_entities::seaorm::common::store::Store::new().base_dir;
let settings =
zesdex_cms::infrastructure::persistence::settings_repo::JsonSettingsRepository::new()
.load(&store_base_dir)
.unwrap_or_default();
let app_config =
zesdex_cms::infrastructure::persistence::app_config_repo::JsonAppConfigRepository::new()
.load(&store_base_dir)
.unwrap_or_default();
let mut api_key = settings
.api_keys
.get(&settings.provider)
.cloned()
.unwrap_or_else(|| {
tracing::warn!(
"[subagent] no API key for provider '{}' in settings, trying env/default",
settings.provider
);
String::new()
});
let model = settings.model.clone();
let base_url = app_config
.providers
.get(&settings.provider)
.map(|p| p.api_base.clone());
if api_key.is_empty() {
if let Some(provider_cfg) = app_config.providers.get(&settings.provider) {
api_key = provider_cfg
.api_key_env
.as_ref()
.and_then(|env| std::env::var(env).ok())
.or_else(|| provider_cfg.default_api_key.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| {
tracing::warn!(
"[subagent] all API key resolution paths exhausted for '{}'",
settings.provider
);
String::new()
});
}
}
(api_key, model, base_url, settings.provider)
}
/// Reject an empty API key with an actionable error instead of letting the
/// caller send a request that is guaranteed to fail once it reaches the network.
///
/// Return: `Ok(())` if `api_key` is non-empty, `Err` with a message naming
/// `provider` and where to fix it otherwise.
fn require_api_key(api_key: &str, provider: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
if api_key.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!(
"no API key configured for provider '{provider}' — set one in Settings or ~/.claude/settings.json"
);
}
Ok(())
}
// ─── Subagent-level tool gating (mirrors Harness checks) ───
const STUB_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"todo!()",
"todo!(",
"unimplemented!()",
"unimplemented!(",
"FIXME",
"fixme:",
"XXX:",
"PLACEHOLDER",
"REPLACE_ME",
"stub_value",
"stub_function",
"fake_response",
"fake_data",
"not implemented",
"not yet implemented",
"to be implemented",
"to be done",
];
const DENIAL_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"// skip",
"// skipping",
"// skipping for now",
"// for now just",
"// punt",
"// hack:",
"// workaround:",
"// cba",
"// later",
"// do later",
"// ignore for now",
"// disable",
"// bypass",
"// quick fix",
"// temp fix",
"// temporary fix",
"// temp:",
"// temporary:",
"// noop",
];
const ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"// assume",
"// probably",
"// guess",
"// should work",
"// hopefully",
"// i think",
"// should be fine",
"// likely",
];
const EXFIL_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
"curl ",
"wget ",
"nc -e ",
"ncat ",
"/dev/tcp/",
"base64 -d |",
"base64 --decode |",
"openssl s_client",
"ssh -R ",
"scp /",
"rsync /",
];
const SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS: &[&str] = &[
".ssh/id_rsa",
".ssh/id_ed25519",
".aws/credentials",
".aws/config",
".kube/config",
".docker/config.json",
"/etc/shadow",
"/etc/passwd",
"/proc/self/environ",
];
const MIN_REASON_LEN: usize = 8;
/// Gate a tool call in the subagent context. Returns `Some(block_reason)` if
/// the call should be blocked, `None` to allow.
///
/// Flow: always blocks dangerous patterns — path traversal, stub/denial/
/// assumption language, bash exfiltration, destructive commands, sensitive
/// path reads — regardless of the allowed-tools list. Tools that are not
/// risky only get the basic allowlist check.
fn gate_subagent_tool_call(tool_name: &str, args: &serde_json::Value) -> Option<String> {
// File-mutating tools: write / edit / delete
if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
if let Some(path) = args.get("path").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
if path.contains("..") {
return Some("path traversal detected in 'path' argument".to_string());
}
}
}
// write / edit require a non-trivial `reason`
if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
return Some(format!(
"{tool_name} requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= {MIN_REASON_LEN} chars) explaining why",
));
}
}
// write / edit content must not contain stubs, denial, or assumption language
if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit") {
let content = match tool_name {
"write" => args.get("content").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
"edit" => {
let old = args.get("old").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let new = args.get("new").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
// For edits, scanning old+new together catches stubs in both
return if contains_any(old, STUB_PATTERNS) || contains_any(new, STUB_PATTERNS) {
Some("content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented".to_string())
} else if contains_any(new, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
Some("content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping".to_string())
} else if contains_any(new, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
Some("content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing".to_string())
} else {
return None;
};
}
_ => "",
};
if contains_any(content, STUB_PATTERNS) {
return Some("content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented".to_string());
}
if contains_any(content, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
return Some(
"content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping"
.to_string(),
);
}
if contains_any(content, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
return Some(
"content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing"
.to_string(),
);
}
}
// Bash: exfiltration, sensitive paths, destructive commands
if tool_name == "bash" {
let cmd = args.get("command").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if cmd.contains("..") {
return Some("path traversal detected in bash command".to_string());
}
// Only check exfiltration for non-standard commands
let is_standard = cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cargo")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("rustc")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("git ")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("ls")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("pwd")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("echo")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cat")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("find")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("grep")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("test");
if !is_standard {
for pat in EXFIL_PATTERNS {
if cmd.contains(pat) {
return Some(format!(
"potential data-exfiltration command blocked (matched '{pat}')"
));
}
}
}
for pat in SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS {
if cmd.contains(pat) {
return Some(format!("refused to read/write sensitive path '{pat}'"));
}
}
let dangerous = [
"rm -rf /",
"rm -rf --no-preserve-root",
"rm -rf ~",
"rm -fr /",
"mkfs.",
"dd if=",
":(){",
"> /dev/sda",
"chmod -R 000 /",
"shutdown ",
"poweroff ",
"reboot ",
"halt ",
];
for pat in &dangerous {
if cmd.contains(pat) {
return Some(format!("destructive command pattern blocked: {pat}"));
}
}
if contains_any(cmd, STUB_PATTERNS) {
return Some("bash command contains stub pattern".to_string());
}
}
// git_operator: require reason
if tool_name == "git_operator" {
let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
return Some("git_operator requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= 8 chars)".to_string());
}
}
None
}
/// Check if `text` matches any pattern (case-insensitive substring).
fn contains_any(text: &str, patterns: &[&str]) -> bool {
let lower = text.to_lowercase();
patterns.iter().any(|p| lower.contains(&p.to_lowercase()))
}
/// Build an ASCII tree of the workspace directory structure for the
/// system prompt, so the LLM can see the file layout.
///
/// Flow: for each root, walk using `ignore::WalkBuilder` (respecting
/// `.gitignore` and hidden files) → prefix `[DIR]` for directories →
/// truncate after 1000 entries.
fn generate_workspace_tree(roots: &[std::path::PathBuf]) -> String {
let mut out = String::new();
out.push_str("Current Workspace Directory Structure:\n");
for root in roots {
writeln!(out, "Root: {}", root.display()).unwrap();
let walker = ignore::WalkBuilder::new(root)
.hidden(true)
.git_ignore(true)
.build();
let mut count = 0;
for entry in walker.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
if let Ok(rel) = path.strip_prefix(root) {
if rel.as_os_str().is_empty() {
continue;
}
let is_dir = entry.file_type().is_some_and(|ft| ft.is_dir());
let prefix = if is_dir { "[DIR] " } else { " " };
writeln!(out, " {}{}", prefix, rel.display()).unwrap();
count += 1;
if count > 1000 {
out.push_str(" ... (truncated)\n");
break;
}
}
}
}
out
}
fn format_subagent_progress(prefix: &str, text: &str) -> String {
let lines: Vec<&str> = text.lines().filter(|l| !l.trim().is_empty()).collect();
@@ -786,19 +424,3 @@ pub fn run_subagent(
let _ = tx.blocking_send(SubagentEvent::Completed);
Ok(output)
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn require_api_key_rejects_empty_key_with_provider_named_in_message() {
let err = require_api_key("", "claude").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("claude"));
}
#[test]
fn require_api_key_accepts_non_empty_key() {
assert!(require_api_key("sk-live-abc123", "claude").is_ok());
}
}
@@ -0,0 +1,165 @@
//! Subagent-level tool gating (mirrors Harness checks).
//!
//! Flow: always blocks dangerous patterns — path traversal, stub/denial/
//! assumption language, bash exfiltration, destructive commands, sensitive
//! path reads — regardless of the allowed-tools list. Tools that are not
//! risky only get the basic allowlist check.
//!
//! Security: subagent tool gating mirrors the main agent's `Guard` checks
//! (path traversal, reason validation, stub/denial/assumption scanning,
//! bash exfiltration and destructive-pattern detection) so that subagents
//! are not a weaker link than the main agent.
use crate::app::guard::patterns::{
ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS, DENIAL_PATTERNS, EXFIL_PATTERNS, MIN_REASON_LEN, SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS,
STUB_PATTERNS,
};
/// Gate a tool call in the subagent context. Returns `Some(block_reason)` if
/// the call should be blocked, `None` to allow.
pub(crate) fn gate_subagent_tool_call(
tool_name: &str,
args: &serde_json::Value,
) -> Option<String> {
// File-mutating tools: write / edit / delete
if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
if let Some(path) = args.get("path").and_then(|v| v.as_str()) {
if path.contains("..") {
return Some("path traversal detected in 'path' argument".to_string());
}
}
}
// write / edit / delete require a non-trivial `reason`
if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit" | "delete") {
let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
return Some(format!(
"{tool_name} requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= {MIN_REASON_LEN} chars) explaining why",
));
}
}
// write / edit content must not contain stubs, denial, or assumption language
if matches!(tool_name, "write" | "edit") {
let content = match tool_name {
"write" => args.get("content").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or(""),
"edit" => {
let old = args.get("old").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
let new = args.get("new").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
// For edits, scanning old+new together catches stubs in both
return if contains_any(old, STUB_PATTERNS)
|| contains_any(new, STUB_PATTERNS)
{
Some(
"content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented"
.to_string(),
)
} else if contains_any(new, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
Some(
"content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping"
.to_string(),
)
} else if contains_any(new, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
Some(
"content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing"
.to_string(),
)
} else {
return None;
};
}
_ => "",
};
if contains_any(content, STUB_PATTERNS) {
return Some(
"content contains stub/placeholder pattern; production code must be fully implemented"
.to_string(),
);
}
if contains_any(content, DENIAL_PATTERNS) {
return Some(
"content contains denial/punt pattern; implement properly instead of skipping"
.to_string(),
);
}
if contains_any(content, ASSUMPTION_PATTERNS) {
return Some(
"content contains assumption pattern; verify against data instead of guessing"
.to_string(),
);
}
}
// Bash: exfiltration, sensitive paths, destructive commands
if tool_name == "bash" {
let cmd = args.get("command").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if cmd.contains("..") {
return Some("path traversal detected in bash command".to_string());
}
// Only check exfiltration for non-standard commands
let is_standard = cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cargo")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("rustc")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("git ")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("ls")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("pwd")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("echo")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("cat")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("find")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("grep")
|| cmd.trim_start().starts_with("test");
if !is_standard {
for pat in EXFIL_PATTERNS {
if cmd.contains(pat) {
return Some(format!(
"potential data-exfiltration command blocked (matched '{pat}')"
));
}
}
}
for pat in SENSITIVE_PATH_PATTERNS {
if cmd.contains(pat) {
return Some(format!("refused to read/write sensitive path '{pat}'"));
}
}
let dangerous = [
"rm -rf /",
"rm -rf --no-preserve-root",
"rm -rf ~",
"rm -fr /",
"mkfs.",
"dd if=",
":(){",
"> /dev/sda",
"chmod -R 000 /",
"shutdown ",
"poweroff ",
"reboot ",
"halt ",
];
for pat in &dangerous {
if cmd.contains(pat) {
return Some(format!("destructive command pattern blocked: {pat}"));
}
}
if contains_any(cmd, STUB_PATTERNS) {
return Some("bash command contains stub pattern".to_string());
}
}
// git_operator: require reason
if tool_name == "git_operator" {
let reason = args.get("reason").and_then(|v| v.as_str()).unwrap_or("");
if reason.trim().len() < MIN_REASON_LEN {
return Some("git_operator requires a non-trivial 'reason' (>= 8 chars)".to_string());
}
}
None
}
/// Check if `text` matches any pattern (case-insensitive substring).
pub(crate) fn contains_any(text: &str, patterns: &[&str]) -> bool {
let lower = text.to_lowercase();
patterns.iter().any(|p| lower.contains(&p.to_lowercase()))
}
@@ -5,4 +5,8 @@ pub mod context;
pub mod division;
pub mod engine;
pub mod event;
pub(crate) mod gating;
pub(crate) mod provider;
pub mod spawn;
pub(crate) mod tools;
pub(crate) mod workspace;
@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
//! Provider configuration resolution for subagents.
//!
//! Resolves the API key, model, and base URL from persisted app config,
//! matching the main agent's credential resolution exactly, so subagents
//! automatically inherit the same provider settings.
use zesdex_cms::domain::repository::AppConfigRepository;
use zesdex_cms::domain::repository::SettingsRepository;
/// Resolve the API key, model, and base URL from persisted app config.
///
/// Flow: try the settings key for the active provider → fall back to the
/// provider's `api_key_env` env-var → fall back to the provider's
/// `default_api_key` → fall back to an empty string.
///
/// Return: `(api_key, model, optional_base_url, provider_name)`. `api_key`
/// is empty when every resolution path was exhausted — callers must check
/// for this before issuing requests (see `run_subagent`).
pub(crate) fn resolve_provider_config() -> (String, String, Option<String>, String) {
let store_base_dir = zesdex_entities::domain::common::store::Store::new().base_dir;
let settings =
zesdex_cms::infrastructure::persistence::settings_repo::JsonSettingsRepository::new()
.load(&store_base_dir)
.unwrap_or_default();
let app_config =
zesdex_cms::infrastructure::persistence::app_config_repo::JsonAppConfigRepository::new()
.load(&store_base_dir)
.unwrap_or_default();
let mut api_key = settings
.api_keys
.get(&settings.provider)
.cloned()
.unwrap_or_else(|| {
tracing::warn!(
"[subagent] no API key for provider '{}' in settings, trying env/default",
settings.provider
);
String::new()
});
let model = settings.model.clone();
let base_url = app_config
.providers
.get(&settings.provider)
.map(|p| p.api_base.clone());
if api_key.is_empty() {
if let Some(provider_cfg) = app_config.providers.get(&settings.provider) {
api_key = provider_cfg
.api_key_env
.as_ref()
.and_then(|env| std::env::var(env).ok())
.or_else(|| provider_cfg.default_api_key.clone())
.unwrap_or_else(|| {
tracing::warn!(
"[subagent] all API key resolution paths exhausted for '{}'",
settings.provider
);
String::new()
});
}
}
(api_key, model, base_url, settings.provider)
}
/// Reject an empty API key with an actionable error instead of letting the
/// caller send a request that is guaranteed to fail once it reaches the network.
///
/// Return: `Ok(())` if `api_key` is non-empty, `Err` with a message naming
/// `provider` and where to fix it otherwise.
pub(crate) fn require_api_key(api_key: &str, provider: &str) -> anyhow::Result<()> {
if api_key.is_empty() {
anyhow::bail!(
"no API key configured for provider '{provider}' — set one in Settings or ~/.claude/settings.json"
);
}
Ok(())
}
#[cfg(test)]
mod tests {
use super::*;
#[test]
fn require_api_key_rejects_empty_key_with_provider_named_in_message() {
let err = require_api_key("", "claude").unwrap_err();
assert!(err.to_string().contains("claude"));
}
#[test]
fn require_api_key_accepts_non_empty_key() {
assert!(require_api_key("sk-live-abc123", "claude").is_ok());
}
}
@@ -1,5 +1,11 @@
//! `AgentDefinition` -- declarative specification for instantiating a
//! subagent from workflow scripts or programmatic calls.
//!
//! Also provides a shared [`spawn_subagent_with_drain`] helper that
//! eliminates the channel-creation + drain-thread boilerplate duplicated
//! across `auto/mod.rs`, `review/mod.rs`, and `workflow/engine/mod.rs`.
use super::event::SubagentEvent;
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
/// Declarative specification for instantiating a subagent: name, role,
@@ -47,3 +53,51 @@ impl AgentDefinition {
}
}
/// Shared subagent spawning utility: creates an mpsc channel and spawns a
/// drain thread that forwards every [`SubagentEvent`] to `on_event`.
///
/// Returns the sender half (for passing to [`run_subagent`](super::engine::run_subagent))
/// and the drain thread's join handle so the caller can keep it alive for
/// the duration of the subagent run.
///
/// # Example
///
/// ```ignore
/// let (tx, _drain) = spawn_subagent_with_drain(|event| {
/// match &event {
/// SubagentEvent::ToolCall { tool, .. } => tracing::debug!("tool: {tool}"),
/// SubagentEvent::Completed => tracing::debug!("done"),
/// _ => {}
/// }
/// });
/// let verdict = run_subagent(&ctx, &tx)?;
/// ```
///
/// # Duplication eliminated
///
/// Previously every subagent caller inlined the same 5-line pattern:
///
/// ```ignore
/// let (tx, mut rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(32);
/// let _drain = std::thread::spawn(move || {
/// while let Some(event) = rx.blocking_recv() { ... }
/// });
/// ```
///
/// Callers that need a larger buffer (e.g. workflow engine uses 64) should
/// create the channel manually instead of using this helper.
pub fn spawn_subagent_with_drain<F>(
on_event: F,
) -> (tokio::sync::mpsc::Sender<SubagentEvent>, std::thread::JoinHandle<()>)
where
F: Fn(SubagentEvent) + Send + 'static,
{
let (tx, mut rx) = tokio::sync::mpsc::channel(32);
let drain = std::thread::spawn(move || {
while let Some(event) = rx.blocking_recv() {
on_event(event);
}
});
(tx, drain)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
//! Subagent tool filtering: maps a subagent's allowed tool names to
//! concrete Tool trait objects and OpenAI-style tool definitions.
//!
//! Flow: load `all_tools()` → if `allowed_tools` is empty, use all; else
//! filter by membership → derive `ToolDef`s for the LLM.
use crate::dto::provider::request::ToolDef;
use crate::tool::{all_tools, tool_defs};
/// Build the tool list for a subagent from its allowlist.
///
/// An empty allowlist means "no restriction" (matches
/// `build_subagent_context`'s default for non-reviewer roles).
///
/// Return: `(tool impls, schema defs)` for the subagent to use.
pub(crate) fn build_subagent_tools(
allowed_tools: &[String],
) -> (Vec<Box<dyn crate::tool::Tool>>, Vec<ToolDef>) {
let all = all_tools();
let filtered: Vec<Box<dyn crate::tool::Tool>> = if allowed_tools.is_empty() {
all.into_iter()
.filter(|t| t.name() != "hive_mind" && t.name() != "workflow_run")
.collect()
} else {
all.into_iter()
.filter(|t| {
allowed_tools.contains(&t.name().to_string())
&& t.name() != "hive_mind"
&& t.name() != "workflow_run"
})
.collect()
};
let defs = tool_defs(&filtered);
(filtered, defs)
}
@@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
//! Workspace directory-tree generation for subagent system prompts.
//!
//! Build an ASCII tree of the workspace directory structure so the LLM
//! can see the file layout.
use std::fmt::Write;
/// Build an ASCII tree of the workspace directory structure for the
/// system prompt, so the LLM can see the file layout.
///
/// Flow: for each root, walk using `ignore::WalkBuilder` (respecting
/// `.gitignore` and hidden files) → prefix `[DIR]` for directories →
/// truncate after 1000 entries.
pub(crate) fn generate_workspace_tree(roots: &[std::path::PathBuf]) -> String {
let mut out = String::new();
out.push_str("Current Workspace Directory Structure:\n");
for root in roots {
writeln!(out, "Root: {}", root.display()).unwrap();
let walker = ignore::WalkBuilder::new(root)
.hidden(true)
.git_ignore(true)
.build();
let mut count = 0;
for entry in walker.flatten() {
let path = entry.path();
if let Ok(rel) = path.strip_prefix(root) {
if rel.as_os_str().is_empty() {
continue;
}
let is_dir = entry.file_type().is_some_and(|ft| ft.is_dir());
let prefix = if is_dir { "[DIR] " } else { " " };
writeln!(out, " {}{}", prefix, rel.display()).unwrap();
count += 1;
if count > 1000 {
out.push_str(" ... (truncated)\n");
break;
}
}
}
}
out
}