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shiro-neko/docs/architecture.md
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Muhammad Zakir Ramadhan 5b8503fcd9 Initial commit: shiro-neko 0.1.0-beta.1
Agentic coding CLI on Bun, Ink, and the AI SDK.

Core: streamText loop with SDK-level tool approval so a denied call provably never executes; endpoint fallback for OpenAI reasoning models; retry with backoff.

Tools: read/write/edit/glob/grep/bash, path-jailed, gitignore-aware, ripgrep with a JS fallback, binary rejection, live bash streaming.

Agents: five variants crossing thinking level with tool restriction; plan and review withhold mutating tools from the model.

Extensibility: frontmatter skills with on-demand bodies, plugin host with blocking hooks, MCP stdio and HTTP, read-only subagents.

State: durable per-project memory, session task lists, session persistence, compaction that repairs provider-item dependencies.

Distribution: five-platform cross-compiled binaries with checksums, install scripts, CI on three operating systems.

404 tests, typecheck clean.
2026-09-02 17:30:18 +07:00

7.0 KiB

Architecture

The loop

One turn is a streamText call whose stream is translated into UI events.

user prompt
  → messages.push({ role: 'user', ... })
  → streamText({ model, system, messages, tools, activeTools, reasoning, toolApproval })
      → for each stream part → yield an AgentEvent
      → if any tool needs approval, the stream ends suspended
          → collect decisions from the UI
          → push a tool message with the approval responses
          → loop
      → otherwise done

src/session.ts is an async generator. The UI consumes events; it never touches the SDK. That is what lets the same session drive the Ink app, the headless printer, and the tests.

Why approval goes through the SDK

An obvious design is a promise inside each tool's execute, resolved when the user answers. That was rejected: it makes "denied" a convention the tool must remember to honour, and one tool forgetting it is a silent security hole.

Instead the SDK's toolApproval is used. A denied call provably never executes — the SDK never reaches execute. The tool cannot opt out because the tool is not consulted.

toolApproval: async ({ toolCall }) => {
  const blocked = await plugins?.guard({ toolName: toolCall.toolName, input: toolCall.input, cwd });
  if (blocked) return { type: 'denied', reason: blocked };   // --yolo cannot reach this
  if (yolo) return undefined;
  if (!needsApproval(toolCall.toolName)) return undefined;
  return 'user-approval';
}

Guards are checked first, so --yolo skips prompts but not refusals.

One subtlety: when this function denies, the SDK emits tool-approval-request with isAutomatic: true and answers it itself. Queueing that would prompt the user for a call that is already settled, so automatic requests are skipped and denial is surfaced from tool-approval-response instead.

Where state lives

The system prompt is rebuilt on every step, not once per turn:

prepareStep: ({ messages }) => {
  const instructions = this.systemFor();          // task list, memory, skills, agent
  if (estimateTokens(messages) <= threshold) return { instructions };
  return { instructions, messages: prunePreservingItems({ messages, reasoning: 'all', ... }) };
}

That is not an optimisation. A todo_write on step one must be visible to step two, and system: on streamText is bound once for the whole run. Returning instructions from prepareStep is the only place per-step state can enter.

The prompt also describes only the tools actually offered this turn. A prompt that mentions a withheld tool teaches the model to attempt impossible calls.

Rendering

Ink re-renders the whole tree on every setState. At 50 tokens a second that is 50 full renders and a visibly flickering terminal.

Two things fix it:

  • Finished lines go into <Static>, rendered once and never redrawn.
  • Token deltas accumulate in a ref and flush on a 60 ms interval, not per token.

Markdown is parsed on every flush. An unclosed fence renders as a code block that grows, which is what a reader expects while text is still arriving.

Input

ink-text-input was replaced. It discards up and down before its own handler, so history recall is impossible, and it only ever shrinks its internal cursor offset, so an externally set value leaves the cursor stranded mid-string.

src/ui/PromptInput.tsx owns the cursor. That also gives home, end, and ctrl-a/e/k/u/w for free. It hands up, down, tab, and escape to a parent callback first, so the command menu and open panels can claim them before the input treats them as editing keys.

Subagents

task runs a nested streamText with only read_file, glob, and grep. It returns one message.

Two consequences follow from the tool set, not from policy:

  • It can never need approval, because it has no gated tools.
  • The parent's context holds the findings, not the search transcript.

Progress is reported through a callback, wired to a bus the panel subscribes to. Without the bus the panel would need a reference to the tool, and the tool would need one to React.

Provider differences

Two are handled explicitly.

Thinking levels. off/low/medium/high/max become reasoning_effort on OpenAI and a thinking token budget on Anthropic. The SDK does the mapping; src/agents.ts only picks the level.

Endpoint fallback. Newer OpenAI models reject function tools on /v1/chat/completions and require /v1/responses. src/fallback.ts presents both as one model and switches when the first rejects the request shape — 400, 404, 405, 415, 422, 501 with isRetryable false. Retryable failures are left to the SDK's backoff.

The switch is sticky. Once an endpoint rejects the shape it will reject every later step too, so re-probing it each turn would waste a round trip per step.

Only api.openai.com gets the chain. Third-party endpoints do not implement /v1/responses.

Compaction and its repair

pruneMessages({ reasoning: 'all' }) strips a reasoning item and keeps the message item from the same response. The responses API treats the message as that reasoning item's dependent and returns 400.

The two carry different ids, so they cannot be matched by id. What links them is the assistant message they arrived in: one message is one response, and its reasoning item covers every other item in it. src/prune.ts drops the dependent parts of any turn whose reasoning was removed — which costs nothing, since pruning was already discarding those turns.

Module map

Module Responsibility
session.ts the loop, approvals, compaction, event stream
tools.ts file and shell tools, ripgrep bridge, bash streaming
ignore.ts gitignore-aware walker, path jail
prompt.ts system prompt assembly from live state
agents.ts variants, thinking levels
skills.ts discovery, catalogue, skill tool
memory.ts durable notes, search, model compaction
notebook.ts session task list
plugins.ts host, hooks, guard chain
subagent.ts task tool and progress events
ask.ts the ask tool
mcp.ts MCP clients and namespacing
fallback.ts endpoint chain
prune.ts provider-item repair
markdown.ts parser, no dependency
store.ts sessions, prompt history
config.ts resolution, model construction
providers.ts presets, /models fetch
pricing.ts USD rates
commands.ts slash registry, parsing, menu matching
headless.ts -p mode
cli.tsx argv, wiring, lifecycle
ui/* Ink components

Every module is pure of the UI except ui/, and ui/ never touches the SDK. The seam is the AgentEvent stream.

Testing

404 tests, no mocking framework. MockLanguageModelV4 from ai/test drives the loop; ink-testing-library drives the UI with real keystrokes; MCP is tested against a real stdio server subprocess; provider wire formats are tested against a local HTTP server.

The pattern throughout is to assert on what actually crossed a boundary — what went on the wire, what is on screen, what is on disk — rather than on internal calls.