Files
shiro-neko/test/subagent.test.ts
T
Muhammad Zakir RamadhanandSisyphus 41546154fe Add the gated worker subagent kind
worker holds the write tools and routes every write and command through the parent's approval gate: same permission rules, same guard, same prompt, flagged as coming from a subagent. Without an approval channel, as in headless runs, the kind is not offered at all rather than silently downgraded to read-only.

Ultraworked with [Sisyphus](https://github.com/code-yeongyu/oh-my-openagent)

Co-authored-by: Sisyphus <clio-agent@sisyphuslabs.ai>
2026-09-03 16:42:20 +07:00

271 lines
10 KiB
TypeScript

import { expect, test } from 'bun:test';
import { MockLanguageModelV4, simulateReadableStream } from 'ai/test';
import type { LanguageModelV4CallOptions, LanguageModelV4StreamPart } from '@ai-sdk/provider';
import { mkdtempSync, rmSync } from 'node:fs';
import { tmpdir } from 'node:os';
import { join } from 'node:path';
import { createHost } from '../src/plugins';
import { guardPlugin } from '../src/plugins-builtin';
import { Session } from '../src/session';
import { createTaskTool } from '../src/subagent';
const usage = {
inputTokens: { total: 10, noCache: 10, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 },
outputTokens: { total: 5 },
} as any;
const stream = (parts: LanguageModelV4StreamPart[]) => ({
stream: simulateReadableStream({ chunks: parts, chunkDelayInMs: null, initialDelayInMs: null }),
});
const toolCall = (id: string, toolName: string, input: unknown): LanguageModelV4StreamPart[] => [
{ type: 'tool-input-start', id, toolName },
{ type: 'tool-input-end', id },
{ type: 'tool-call', toolCallId: id, toolName, input: JSON.stringify(input) },
{ type: 'finish', finishReason: { unified: 'tool-calls', raw: 'tool_use' }, usage },
];
const text = (body: string): LanguageModelV4StreamPart[] => [
{ type: 'text-start', id: '0' },
{ type: 'text-delta', id: '0', delta: body },
{ type: 'text-end', id: '0' },
{ type: 'finish', finishReason: { unified: 'stop', raw: 'stop' }, usage },
];
function inTempDir<T>(fn: (dir: string) => Promise<T>): Promise<T> {
const orig = process.cwd();
const dir = mkdtempSync(join(tmpdir(), 'shiro-sub-'));
process.chdir(dir);
return fn(dir).finally(() => {
process.chdir(orig);
rmSync(dir, { recursive: true, force: true });
});
}
test('subagent greps the workspace and returns text to the parent', async () =>
inTempDir(async () => {
await Bun.write('src/auth.ts', 'export function login() {}\n');
// Two independent loops share this model: the parent, then the subagent.
const seen: LanguageModelV4CallOptions[] = [];
const model = new MockLanguageModelV4({
doStream: async (opts) => {
const call = seen.length;
seen.push(opts);
if (call === 0) {
return stream(
toolCall('c1', 'task', { description: 'find auth', prompt: 'Find where login is defined under src/.' }),
);
}
if (call === 1) return stream(toolCall('s1', 'grep', { pattern: 'login', include: '**/*.ts' }));
if (call === 2) return stream(text('login() is defined at src/auth.ts:1'));
return stream(text('The subagent found it in src/auth.ts.'));
},
});
const session = new Session({
model,
askApproval: async () => {
throw new Error('the task tool must never require approval');
},
extraTools: { task: createTaskTool({ model }) },
autoApprove: ['task'],
});
const events: string[] = [];
for await (const ev of session.send('where is login defined?')) events.push(ev.type);
expect(events).toEqual(['tool-start', 'tool-call', 'tool-result', 'text', 'done']);
// An explore subagent holds no mutating tool, so it cannot reach the approval
// gate at all. That is structural rather than policy.
const subagentTools = (seen[1]?.tools ?? []).map((t) => t.name);
for (const write of ['write_file', 'edit_file', 'multi_edit', 'bash']) {
expect(subagentTools).not.toContain(write);
}
expect(subagentTools).toContain('grep');
// Its findings reach the parent as a tool result, not as raw transcript.
const toolMessage = session.messages.find((m) => m.role === 'tool');
expect(JSON.stringify(toolMessage)).toContain('src/auth.ts:1');
}));
test('a worker subagent edits a file, and the write goes through the parent gate', async () =>
inTempDir(async () => {
await Bun.write('app.ts', 'const port = 8080;\n');
const asked: { toolName: string; subagent?: boolean }[] = [];
const seen: LanguageModelV4CallOptions[] = [];
const model = new MockLanguageModelV4({
doStream: async (opts) => {
const call = seen.length;
seen.push(opts);
if (call === 0) {
return stream(
toolCall('c1', 'task', { description: 'bump the port', prompt: 'Set port to 9090 in app.ts.', kind: 'worker' }),
);
}
if (call === 1) {
return stream(
toolCall('s1', 'edit_file', { path: 'app.ts', oldString: 'const port = 8080;', newString: 'const port = 9090;' }),
);
}
if (call === 2) return stream(text('Changed app.ts: port is now 9090.'));
return stream(text('The worker bumped the port.'));
},
});
const session: Session = new Session({
model,
askApproval: async (req) => {
asked.push({ toolName: req.toolName, ...(req.subagent ? { subagent: true } : {}) });
return 'once';
},
extraTools: {
task: createTaskTool({ model, approve: (r) => session.approveForSubagent()(r) }),
},
autoApprove: ['task'],
});
for await (const _ of session.send('bump the port')) void _;
// The write reached the user's prompt, flagged as coming from a subagent, and
// the file on disk actually changed.
expect(asked).toEqual([{ toolName: 'edit_file', subagent: true }]);
expect(await Bun.file('app.ts').text()).toBe('const port = 9090;\n');
}));
test('a denied worker write leaves the file alone and the worker reports it', async () =>
inTempDir(async () => {
await Bun.write('app.ts', 'const port = 8080;\n');
const seen: LanguageModelV4CallOptions[] = [];
const model = new MockLanguageModelV4({
doStream: async (opts) => {
const call = seen.length;
seen.push(opts);
if (call === 0) {
return stream(toolCall('c1', 'task', { description: 'bump it', prompt: 'set 9090', kind: 'worker' }));
}
if (call === 1) {
return stream(
toolCall('s1', 'edit_file', { path: 'app.ts', oldString: 'const port = 8080;', newString: 'const port = 9090;' }),
);
}
if (call === 2) return stream(text('The user denied the edit, so I stopped.'));
return stream(text('The worker was denied.'));
},
});
const session: Session = new Session({
model,
askApproval: async () => 'deny',
extraTools: {
task: createTaskTool({ model, approve: (r) => session.approveForSubagent()(r) }),
},
autoApprove: ['task'],
});
for await (const _ of session.send('bump the port')) void _;
expect(await Bun.file('app.ts').text()).toBe('const port = 8080;\n');
expect(JSON.stringify(session.messages)).toContain('denied');
}));
test('a permission rule denies a worker write without ever prompting', async () =>
inTempDir(async () => {
await Bun.write('app.ts', 'const port = 8080;\n');
const seen: LanguageModelV4CallOptions[] = [];
const model = new MockLanguageModelV4({
doStream: async (opts) => {
const call = seen.length;
seen.push(opts);
if (call === 0) {
return stream(toolCall('c1', 'task', { description: 'bump it', prompt: 'set 9090', kind: 'worker' }));
}
if (call === 1) {
return stream(
toolCall('s1', 'edit_file', { path: 'app.ts', oldString: 'const port = 8080;', newString: 'const port = 9090;' }),
);
}
if (call === 2) return stream(text('That edit was refused.'));
return stream(text('Refused.'));
},
});
const session: Session = new Session({
model,
askApproval: async () => {
throw new Error('a rule that denies must not reach the prompt');
},
permissions: { edit_file: { '*': 'deny' } },
extraTools: {
task: createTaskTool({ model, approve: (r) => session.approveForSubagent()(r) }),
},
autoApprove: ['task'],
});
for await (const _ of session.send('bump the port')) void _;
expect(await Bun.file('app.ts').text()).toBe('const port = 8080;\n');
}));
test('the guard plugin refuses a worker command, as it does a direct one', async () =>
inTempDir(async () => {
const seen: LanguageModelV4CallOptions[] = [];
const model = new MockLanguageModelV4({
doStream: async (opts) => {
const call = seen.length;
seen.push(opts);
if (call === 0) {
return stream(toolCall('c1', 'task', { description: 'clean', prompt: 'clean the tree', kind: 'worker' }));
}
if (call === 1) return stream(toolCall('s1', 'bash', { command: 'rm -rf build' }));
if (call === 2) return stream(text('That command was refused.'));
return stream(text('Refused.'));
},
});
const session: Session = new Session({
yolo: true,
model,
askApproval: async () => {
throw new Error('the guard must refuse without asking');
},
plugins: createHost([guardPlugin]),
extraTools: {
task: createTaskTool({ model, approve: (r) => session.approveForSubagent()(r) }),
},
autoApprove: ['task'],
});
for await (const _ of session.send('clean up')) void _;
expect(await Bun.file('build').exists()).toBe(false);
}));
test('subagent does not see the parent conversation', async () =>
inTempDir(async () => {
const seen: LanguageModelV4CallOptions[] = [];
const model = new MockLanguageModelV4({
doStream: async (opts) => {
const call = seen.length;
seen.push(opts);
if (call === 0) return stream(toolCall('c1', 'task', { description: 'probe', prompt: 'Look at glob src/*.' }));
if (call === 1) return stream(text('nothing notable'));
return stream(text('done'));
},
});
const session = new Session({
model,
askApproval: async () => 'deny',
extraTools: { task: createTaskTool({ model }) },
autoApprove: ['task'],
});
for await (const _ of session.send('MY-SECRET-PARENT-CONTEXT')) void _;
expect(JSON.stringify(seen[1]?.prompt)).not.toContain('MY-SECRET-PARENT-CONTEXT');
expect(JSON.stringify(seen[1]?.prompt)).toContain('Look at glob src/*.');
}));