# Plugins A plugin extends the agent in four ways: it can add tools, mark tools auto-approved, block a tool call before it runs, and append to the system prompt. It can also run something after each turn. Two kinds exist, and only one can contain code: - **Builtin** plugins are compiled into the binary and may do anything in the interface below. - **Installed** plugins come from a registry as a JSON manifest of refusal rules. They are data: the guard evaluating them is compiled code, identical for every install. See [registry](registry.md). Loading TypeScript from disk or a URL is deliberately not supported. A plugin that can block tool calls can also lie about blocking them, and one that could execute could read every file the agent can read. That is a sandbox problem, not a loader problem — see [ROADMAP.md](../ROADMAP.md). ## Enabling ```json { "plugins": ["guard", "time"] } ``` That is also the default when the field is absent, and it lists **builtin** plugins only. Installed plugins are always active once present, because installing one was the decision to enable it; remove it with `/registry remove `. `--no-plugins` disables everything, builtin and installed, including the guard. `/plugins` lists what is active, marks installed entries, and reports any name that did not resolve. ## The interface ```ts export type Plugin = { name: string; description: string; tools?: ToolSet; autoApprove?: readonly string[]; beforeToolCall?: (ctx: { toolName: string; input: unknown; cwd: string }) => string | undefined | Promise; afterTurn?: () => void | Promise; appendix?: string; }; ``` `beforeToolCall` returning a string **blocks** the call, and the string is given to the model as the reason. Returning `undefined` allows it. Two decisions worth knowing about: **A throwing hook blocks.** A guard that crashes must fail closed. Treating an exception as "allow" would mean a bug in a security plugin silently disables it. **Blocks are checked before approval.** `--yolo` skips prompts; it does not skip guards. A plugin block is a refusal, not a permission question. **A guard sees `bash` before the command runs, not while it runs.** The guard is the only thing that can refuse a command outright; once one is running, `ctrl-c` is what stops it. Both matter: a pattern the guard does not know about is still interruptible by hand. ## Builtins ### `guard` (default on) Refuses irreversible shell commands outright. Approval alone is a weak defence here: a user holding `a` through a batch of edits will approve one of these without reading it. | Pattern | Why | |---|---| | `rm -rf`, `rm -f` | recursive or forced delete | | `git reset --hard` | discards uncommitted work | | `git clean -f` | deletes untracked files | | `git push --force`, `--force-with-lease`, `-f` | rewrites remote history | | `git branch -D` | deletes a branch without a merge check | | `DROP TABLE`, `TRUNCATE` | destroys database data | | `mkfs`, `dd of=/dev/…`, `> /dev/sd…` | writes to a raw device | | `chmod 777` | makes files world-writable | | `shutdown`, `reboot`, `halt` | affects the whole machine | | `:(){ :\|:& };:` | fork bomb | | `curl … \| sh`, `wget … \| sh` | pipes a download into a shell | ``` Blocked by the guard plugin: refusing "rm -rf build" (recursive or forced delete). Ask the user to run it themselves if it is really needed. ``` The model is told to relay the command rather than work around it. `rm build/one-file.js`, `git push origin feature`, and `git commit` all pass — the patterns target irreversibility, not the commands themselves. Two honest limits. The patterns match the command **string**, so `bash -c "$(echo cm0gLXJm | base64 -d)"` is not caught, and neither is a script the agent wrote and then ran. And it only inspects `bash`: a `write_file` overwriting something important is an approval question, not a guard question. The guard is the last line before a command runs; `ctrl-c` is the one after. A pattern the guard does not know about is still interruptible by hand — see [tools](tools.md#bash). ### `time` (default on) Adds `current_time`, returning ISO 8601 plus the local string. Auto-approved; it reads nothing. Useful because models are confidently wrong about the date. ### `bell` (opt in) Writes `\u0007` to stderr when a turn ends. Off by default — a bell after every turn is intrusive, but it is genuinely useful when a turn takes minutes. ```json { "plugins": ["guard", "time", "bell"] } ``` ## Writing one A refusal rule is usually better as an installed manifest: no rebuild, and nothing to review. See [registry](registry.md) for the manifest shape. Reach for a builtin only when the plugin needs to contribute a tool or run something after a turn. Builtin plugins live in `src/plugins-builtin.ts` and are registered in `BUILTIN_PLUGINS`. ```ts export const noSecretsPlugin: Plugin = { name: 'no-secrets', description: 'refuses to write files that look like credentials', appendix: 'The no-secrets plugin refuses writes to .env and credential files. Ask the user to ' + 'add secrets themselves rather than working around it.', beforeToolCall: ({ toolName, input }) => { if (!['write_file', 'edit_file', 'multi_edit', 'apply_patch'].includes(toolName)) return undefined; const path = String((input as { path?: unknown } | null)?.path ?? ''); if (/(^|\/)\.env|credentials|\.pem$/.test(path)) { return `refusing to write ${path}; add secrets yourself`; } return undefined; }, }; ``` Then add it to `BUILTIN_PLUGINS` and, if it should be on by default, `DEFAULT_ENABLED`. Note the four tool names. Every write tool has to be listed, and `multi_edit` is easy to miss — a guard that only checks `write_file` and `edit_file` is bypassed by a batch edit. Write the `appendix` whenever the plugin can block something. Without it the model hits a refusal it was never told about and tries to route around it. ## Ordering Builtin plugins run first, in the order they are enabled, then installed ones. The first `beforeToolCall` to block wins; later hooks are not consulted. `afterTurn` runs every hook, and one throwing does not stop the rest.