# Tools ## The approval model Every call resolves to `allow`, `ask`, or `deny` through a rule matched against the call's subject — the command for `bash`, the path for a file tool. [Permissions](permissions.md) is the full reference; the short version: **Allowed by default.** Read-only tools and anything touching the agent's own state: `read_file`, `read_many_files`, `glob`, `grep`, `list_dir`, `task`, the whole git set, `todo_write`, `remember`, `recall`, `forget`, `skill`, `ask`, and anything a plugin marks auto-approved. **Denied by default.** `*.env`, `*.env.*`, and `*.pem` on read. Not gated, refused: a secret that reaches the context is on the wire and in the session file, and there is no taking it back. `*.env.example` is allowed. **Asked by default.** `write_file`, `edit_file`, `multi_edit`, `bash`, and every `mcp__*` tool. ``` bash wants to run git status --porcelain y allow once | a always allow bash git * | n deny ``` `a` whitelists the **pattern**, not the tool: approving `git status` runs `git log` unprompted and still asks about `npm publish`. `n` tells the model it was denied and to ask what to do instead. A rule turns the common cases off entirely: ```json { "permission": { "bash": { "*": "ask", "git *": "allow", "bun test*": "allow" } } } ``` Three more things sit around the rules: - **The guard plugin refuses first.** It is not an approval, and `--yolo` does not reach it. See [plugins](plugins.md). - **A repeated call asks anyway.** The same tool with identical input three times in one turn stops for approval even when allowed — a model repeating itself is not making progress. - **The SDK enforces the decision.** A denied call provably never executes, because the SDK never reaches the tool's `execute`. A tool cannot forget to honour a denial. See [architecture](architecture.md#why-approval-goes-through-the-sdk). ## Tool sets Each tool costs its name, its description, and its JSON schema on **every request**. Measured across the fourteen built-ins: | Tool | Bytes | Tool | Bytes | |---|---|---|---| | `read_many_files` | 972 | `git_blame` | 499 | | `multi_edit` | 934 | `git_log` | 484 | | `edit_file` | 618 | `git_diff` | 473 | | `grep` | 595 | `bash` | 466 | | `list_dir` | 594 | `git_show` | 432 | | `read_file` | 526 | `git_status` | 292 | | `glob` | 499 | `write_file` | 289 | 7,673 bytes for all fourteen, averaging 548. Roughly 1,900 tokens per request before your prompt or the conversation. Selection accuracy also falls as the list grows: a model choosing between six tools picks better than one choosing between twenty. Sets let you switch off what a project does not need: | Set | Tools | Cost | |---|---|---| | `core` | `read_file` `write_file` `edit_file` `glob` `grep` `bash` | ~2,993 B | | `edit-plus` | `multi_edit` `list_dir` `read_many_files` | ~2,500 B | | `git` | `git_status` `git_diff` `git_log` `git_show` `git_blame` | ~2,180 B | ```json { "toolSets": ["edit-plus"] } ``` Omit `toolSets` for all of them. `core` is always on — without read, edit, and bash the agent is not an agent. A disabled set reaches neither the wire nor the system prompt, since a prompt that names an absent tool teaches the model to attempt calls that cannot succeed. Session, plugin, and MCP tools are not part of this budget and are never gated here. An unrecognised set name is dropped silently. The header line at startup shows which sets actually loaded, so a typo reads as "that set is off" rather than as an error — worth checking if a tool you expected is missing. `/tools` shows which set each live tool came from: ``` tools 20 offered this turn of 22 registered - `bash` core - `git_diff` git - `list_dir` edit-plus - `remember` ``` A tool with no set is a session, plugin, or MCP tool. ### Which sets to keep Both extra sets earn their place in most projects, but not all: - **No git in the repo?** `git` is 2,180 bytes the model can never use. Switch it off. - **A model that handles many tools badly?** `{ "toolSets": [] }` trims to six, which is the smallest set that still lets the agent work. - **Reading a lot, editing rarely?** Keep `edit-plus` for `list_dir` and `read_many_files` alone; they pay for themselves in round trips saved. ## File tools ### `read_file` ``` path file path relative to the workspace root offset first line, 1-based limit max lines, default 2000 ``` Returns contents with 1-based line numbers. Refuses binaries: a NUL byte in the first 8 KB means the file is not text, and a model that reads a 90 MB executable has burned its whole context on nothing. ### `read_many_files` ``` files [{ path, offset?, limit? }], at most 20 ``` One round trip for several files, each with its own window. Reads run concurrently and the blocks come back in the order given, labelled: ``` ===== src/app.ts ===== 1: export const port = 8080; ===== src/gone.ts ===== [unreadable: No such file: src/gone.ts] ``` A path that cannot be read is reported in its own block rather than throwing, so one wrong guess costs a line instead of the whole call. Numbering and binary refusal are the same code path as `read_file`, so a batch read cannot drift from a single one. ### `write_file` ``` path file path content full contents ``` New files and full rewrites only. Creates parent directories. ### `edit_file` ``` path file path oldString exact text to find, whitespace and indentation included newString replacement replaceAll replace every occurrence instead of requiring exactly one ``` `oldString` must match byte-for-byte and appear exactly once unless `replaceAll` is set. An ambiguous match is an error naming the count, which pushes the model to add surrounding context rather than guessing which occurrence it meant: ``` oldString appears 3 times in src/users.ts. Add surrounding context or set replaceAll. ``` That error is deliberately specific. `edit failed` would leave the model to retry blind; the count tells it what to do next. ### `multi_edit` ``` path file path edits [{ oldString, newString, replaceAll? }], in the order to apply them ``` Several edits to one file in one call, one approval, one write. Each edit sees the result of the previous one, so edits may build on each other. Atomic: every edit is validated and applied in memory first, so a failure on the third edit leaves the file exactly as it was rather than half-changed. The same uniqueness rule as `edit_file` applies per edit, and the error names which edit failed: ``` edit 2: oldString not found in src/users.ts. No edits were applied. ``` The last sentence matters. Without it a model reading the error has to guess whether edit 1 landed, and its next move — retry the whole batch, or only what failed — depends on the answer. ### `list_dir` ``` path directory, relative to the workspace root, default the root depth levels to descend, 1-6, default 2 includeIgnored also show files git ignores ``` Tree view honouring `.gitignore`. Directories end with `/`, files show their size: ``` . README.md 2B src/ app.ts 2K ui/ ``` Past the depth limit the containing directory is still listed, so the shape of the tree stays visible without its contents — `src/ui/` above appears at `depth: 2` even though its files do not. Capped at 300 entries. ### `glob` ``` pattern e.g. "src/**/*.ts" limit max paths, default 200 includeIgnored also return files git ignores ``` Walks the tree honouring `.gitignore` and `.shiroignore`, skipping `.git` and `node_modules` unconditionally. Nested ignore files apply only within their own directory, as git does. Returns posix paths relative to the workspace root. A symlinked directory is classified as a directory and not descended into. Both halves matter: `readdir` reports a junction as a non-directory, so without the extra `stat` a symlinked directory leaked past `dir/` ignore rules and was yielded as a file with a nonsense size. Not descending is separate — a link can point anywhere, including back into the tree. ### `grep` ``` pattern regex source include glob limiting the search, default "**/*" ignoreCase case-insensitive includeIgnored also search files git ignores ``` Shells out to ripgrep when it is on PATH — roughly 15x faster on a real repo — and falls back to a JavaScript walker otherwise. Output is `path:line: text` either way, so the model sees one format regardless. Skips binaries. Caps at 200 hits. Two details keep the two paths in agreement. ripgrep is passed `--no-require-git`, because it otherwise ignores `.gitignore` outside a repository while the JavaScript fallback always honours it. And an rg exit code above 1 means rg could not run the search at all, so the fallback takes over; exit 1 is simply "no matches" and is reported as such. Regex syntax differs between the two: ripgrep is Rust regex, the fallback is JavaScript. A pattern using look-around works in the fallback and fails under rg. An invalid pattern is reported as `Invalid regex: ` rather than returning an empty result set. ### `bash` ``` command shell command timeout ms, default 120000, max 600000 ``` Runs in the workspace root through `bash -lc` or `cmd /c`. Output streams live to the panel above the input rather than appearing all at once when the command exits — a two-minute test run is otherwise indistinguishable from a hang. Both pipes are drained concurrently, since a command that fills one while you block on the other deadlocks. Returns exit code, stdout, stderr, and a note if a signal killed it. **`ctrl-c` interrupts the command, not the turn.** The shell and everything it started are killed — on Windows through `taskkill /T`, because killing `cmd` alone leaves the real command holding both pipes open and the read never ends. The call then fails rather than returning, so the model cannot mistake a killed command for one that ran and failed on its own: ``` The user interrupted this command. It did not finish, so its effects are unknown. stdout: [whatever it printed first] ``` The turn continues from there. `esc` still aborts everything, and `ctrl-c` with nothing running quits as usual. ## Git tools All five are read-only and therefore approval-free. Each spawns `git` with a fixed argument array rather than a shell string, so an argument like `--author="; rm -rf /"` can only ever be a literal argument — which is what makes auto-approval safe. A test asserts exactly that: `git_log` with the path `; touch pwned.txt` creates no file. Output is described rather than raw porcelain. `git_status` names the branch and says `staged modified` or `untracked` per file instead of leaving the model to decode porcelain's two leading columns: ``` On main, 2 changed: src/app.ts (staged modified, modified) new.ts (untracked) ``` That file has a staged change *and* a later unstaged one, which the raw `MM` prefix conveys only to a reader who knows the format. Outside a repository they fail with ` is not a git repository.` rather than passing git's own error text through. Other git failures do pass through, on purpose: `git_show no-such-ref` reports what git said, because git's own message is the most useful thing available. ``` git_status branch, staged, modified, untracked git_diff staged? path? unified diff of uncommitted changes git_log limit? path? hash, date, author, subject; newest first git_show ref path? one commit: message, author, diff git_blame path startLine? endLine? who last changed each line ``` `git_log` defaults to 15 commits and caps at 40. `git_blame` without a range blames the whole file; with `startLine` and no `endLine` it covers 40 lines from there. Everything here is also reachable through `bash`. The reason the set exists anyway is the approval boundary: `bash git diff` stops for a decision on every call, while `git_diff` cannot mutate anything and so never needs one. ## Agent tools ### `task` ``` description short label shown to you prompt self-contained instructions kind "explore" (default) or "review" ``` Spawns a read-only subagent with `read_file`, `glob`, and `grep` only. It returns one report, so the parent pays for findings rather than the whole search transcript. It sees none of the parent conversation, so its prompt has to stand alone. Two properties follow from that tool set rather than from policy: it can never trigger an approval prompt, because it has no gated tools; and the parent's context holds the conclusion instead of the search. A subagent reading forty files to answer one question costs the parent the answer, not the forty files. `explore` finds and reports. `review` critiques code in severity order. Progress streams to the subagent panel. Capped at 20 steps, and it shares the parent's model — an `explore` run pays reasoning rates for what is really a search, which is [on the list](../TODO.md) to fix. Not worth delegating a single grep: the subagent is a whole extra model loop, so it wins on a search spanning many files and loses on anything you could answer in one call. ### `ask` ``` question one specific question options choices, recommendation first, each with an optional detail multiple allow more than one ``` Stops the turn and puts the question on screen. With options it is a picker; without, free text. `esc` skips, which returns "the user dismissed this; use your best judgement" — so a dismissal is an instruction to decide, not a dead end. Withheld entirely in headless mode — a question with no one to answer it would hang. The system prompt says so, and tells the model to decide and state its assumption instead. ### `todo_write` ``` todos the complete list: content, status, optional note ``` Statuses: `pending`, `in_progress`, `done`, `blocked`. Send the whole list each time; it replaces the previous one. Warns when more than one task is `in_progress`, when nothing is `in_progress` while work remains, or when a `blocked` task has no note. The list lives in the system prompt, rebuilt every step, so it survives both pruning and `/compact`. See [memory](memory.md). ### `remember`, `recall`, `forget` Durable per-project notes. See [memory](memory.md). ### `skill` ``` name skill name from the catalogue ``` Loads the body of a skill. See [skills](skills.md). ## Path safety Every path a tool receives goes through a jail: resolved against the workspace root, then checked that it did not escape. ```ts export function jail(p: string, root = process.cwd()): string { const abs = isAbsolute(p) ? resolve(p) : resolve(root, p); const rel = relative(resolve(root), abs); if (rel.startsWith('..') || isAbsolute(rel)) throw new Error(`Path escapes workspace: ${p}`); return abs; } ``` `../../etc/passwd`, `a/../../secret`, and absolute paths outside the root are all refused before any filesystem call. Resolving first and comparing after is what catches the middle case: string-prefix checks on the raw input miss `a/../../secret` entirely. The model's output is a trust boundary. It can emit any string, so the check happens on every call rather than being assumed. That includes `read_many_files`, where a bad path is reported in its block like any other unreadable file. `jail` guards the workspace, not the shell. `bash` runs whatever it is given, which is why every call needs approval and why the guard plugin exists — see [plugins](plugins.md). ## Output caps Any single tool result is truncated at 30,000 characters with a note saying how much was cut: ``` ... [truncated 41,233 chars] ``` | Tool | Cap | |---|---| | any result | 30,000 characters | | `grep` | 200 hits, each line cut at 300 chars | | `glob` | 200 paths | | `list_dir` | 300 entries | | `read_many_files` | 20 files | | `read_file` | 2,000 lines by default | | `bash` | 120 s default timeout, 600 s max | Without caps one `grep` for `function` can end a session. The caps are per call, so a model that needs more can narrow and ask again — which is cheaper than one call that fills the context and forces compaction.