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Commits
| Author | SHA1 | Message | Date | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
 Muhammad Zakir Ramadhan
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7fd578e13b |
Gate tool calls per command and path, not per tool name
Approval was a list of tool names: `bash` needed it, `read_file` did not. That
fails in a specific way. `bash` covers `git status` and `rm -rf` equally, so a
user working through a batch presses `a` — always allow — on the first prompt and
every later command runs unasked, including the one they would have refused. The
gate was strongest when it mattered least and gone by the time it mattered.
Rules now match the *subject* of a call: the command for `bash`, the path for a
file tool, the pattern for a search.
"permission": {
"bash": { "*": "ask", "git *": "allow", "rm *": "deny" },
"edit_file": { "*": "deny", "src/generated/*": "allow" }
}
Plain last-match-wins, with no special case for deny. An earlier version made
deny win wherever it sat, on the theory that a refusal should be impossible to
undo by accident, and it made default-deny-with-exceptions unexpressible — which
is the shape a careful user actually writes, and the same shape as `*.env` denied
while `*.env.example` is allowed. Refusals that must never be configurable stay
in the guard plugin, which runs ahead of this and which --yolo cannot reach.
Three behaviours fall out of it:
- `always` grants the pattern the tool suggests, not the tool. Approving
`git status` runs `git log` unprompted and still asks about `npm publish`.
- `.env`, `.env.*`, and `.pem` are denied on read by default. Not gated, refused:
a secret that reaches the context is on the wire and in the session file, and
there is no taking it back. `.env.example` stays allowed.
- A call repeated identically three times in one turn asks even when allowed. A
model repeating itself is not making progress, and `bash: allow` is a statement
about which commands are safe rather than permission to loop.
The prompt now says which rule matched and what `always` would grant:
bash wants to run
git status --porcelain
y allow once | a always allow bash git * | n deny
A typo in a decision string is dropped at parse time, leaving the tool on its
default. Treating an unparseable value as `allow` would mean one misspelling
silently removing the gate.
Written after surveying Claude Code, Codex, opencode, and phi. Three of the four
had already moved to per-pattern rules; the credential deny and the repeat guard
come from opencode directly. ROADMAP records what was deliberately not taken and
why — OS sandboxing needs three platform implementations and is worse than
nothing if half-built, and opencode's own docs say LSP integration is often not a
net positive.
581 tests, up from 572. The engine is a pure function tested on its own, and the
loop is tested through a real Session: an allowed pattern never prompts, a denied
one never executes, and a `.env` read leaves no secret in the transcript.
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Muhammad Zakir Ramadhan
|
9b978fdbe1 |
Expand the documentation with measured figures and operational detail
Most of this replaces "roughly 550 characters per tool" with the actual per-tool measurements, and fills in the parts a reader hits after the happy path: what a specific error means, what a setting costs, what is not covered. Measured rather than estimated: - Per-tool byte cost, all fourteen, and the per-set totals. 7,673 B for the full set, averaging 548. - Builtin skill bodies at 5,284 B against a 681 B catalogue, which is the argument for loading bodies on demand. - Full system prompt 3,571 chars, core-only 2,045. New sections: - tools: which sets to keep and why, the jail function itself, an output-cap table, and the real error strings for edit_file and multi_edit. - configuration: env var per provider preset, cost-estimate limits, what each --no-* flag isolates, and three settings that do more than they look like. - agents: step caps per variant, which variant to reach for, and the fact that reasoning is charged as output and discarded first by compaction. - headless: exit code 0 means "the turn completed", not "the answer was yes" — with the jq pattern for gating on content. Timeouts, concurrent -c runs fighting over one session, CI recipes for --no-skills. - mcp: parallel connect, startup cost, a debugging ladder, and that toolSets does not gate MCP tools. - registry: publishing, local testing over http://localhost, and a troubleshooting section keyed on the actual validator messages. - memory: what compaction discards in what order, /compact versus automatic pruning, and that -c matches on cwd. - skills: the frontmatter reader's limits, and how to verify a skill loaded. Corrections found while cross-checking against the source: - The guard table was missing --force-with-lease and > /dev/sd… - The done event's token fields are optional, so the jq example filters on one rather than assuming it. Two honest limits now written down: the guard matches command strings, so a base64-decoded or script-wrapped command is not caught; and a registry index is trusted for its contents, not its authorship. Verified: all internal links and heading anchors resolve, every docs/ page is reachable from the README, 538 tests pass, typecheck clean. |
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Muhammad Zakir Ramadhan
|
2fa6ee247b |
Add batch reads, @file completion, interruptible commands, tool sets
Tools, six built-in to fourteen: - read_many_files: up to 20 paths read concurrently, each with its own window. An unreadable path is reported in its own block instead of throwing. - multi_edit: several edits to one file, validated in memory first so a late failure cannot leave the file half-written. - list_dir: ignore-aware depth-limited tree. - git_status/diff/log/show/blame: read-only, spawned with a fixed argv rather than a shell string, which is what makes them safe to auto-approve. toolSets gates them. core is always on; edit-plus and git are optional. A disabled set reaches neither the wire nor the system prompt, since a prompt naming an absent tool teaches calls that cannot succeed. Interface: - Reasoning streams to a collapsed panel, ctrl-r expands, dropped when the turn ends: it is progress, not the answer. - The tool in flight is named from tool-input-start, before its arguments finish streaming, and cleared on its result. - Prompts typed mid-turn queue and drain in order. esc clears the queue as well as aborting. - @ opens a path picker fed by the ignore-aware walker. Prefix matches rank above substring matches, so @src/ means "under src/". The walk runs on the first @, not at startup. ctrl-c kills the command in flight and keeps the turn. The call throws rather than returning, so the model cannot read a killed command as one that ran and failed on its own terms. The kill takes the whole process tree: killing cmd /c alone left the real command holding both pipes open, so the read never returned and the interrupt did nothing for 19 seconds. Two pruning fixes: - A tool result whose tool call was pruned is now dropped with it. Pruning counts messages, so the cut landed between an assistant tool-call and the tool message answering it, producing 400 "No tool call found for function call output with call_id ...". The reverse pairing is left alone: a call awaiting its result is what a suspended approval looks like. - ignore.ts called statFs without importing it, so walk() crashed on the first symlink. 482 tests, up from 404. Docs synced across README, ROADMAP, TODO, and all of docs/: tool sets, the new tools, ctrl-c semantics, the tool-start event, and the two hand-maintained tool-name lists recorded as a known weakness. |
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Muhammad Zakir Ramadhan
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5b8503fcd9 |
Initial commit: shiro-neko 0.1.0-beta.1
Agentic coding CLI on Bun, Ink, and the AI SDK. Core: streamText loop with SDK-level tool approval so a denied call provably never executes; endpoint fallback for OpenAI reasoning models; retry with backoff. Tools: read/write/edit/glob/grep/bash, path-jailed, gitignore-aware, ripgrep with a JS fallback, binary rejection, live bash streaming. Agents: five variants crossing thinking level with tool restriction; plan and review withhold mutating tools from the model. Extensibility: frontmatter skills with on-demand bodies, plugin host with blocking hooks, MCP stdio and HTTP, read-only subagents. State: durable per-project memory, session task lists, session persistence, compaction that repairs provider-item dependencies. Distribution: five-platform cross-compiled binaries with checksums, install scripts, CI on three operating systems. 404 tests, typecheck clean. |