feat: add corex-storage crate for unified storage abstraction
- Introduced corex-storage crate with support for local disk, S3-compatible, and Google Cloud Storage backends. - Implemented StorageDriver trait for various storage backends. - Added LocalFileStorage for local disk operations. - Added S3Storage for S3-compatible object storage with multipart upload support. - Added GcsStorage for Google Cloud Storage operations. - Included error handling for storage operations. - Added tests for each storage backend to ensure functionality. - Created README.md for documentation and usage examples. - Added Apache and MIT licenses for open-source compliance.
This commit is contained in:
asepharyana
@@ -0,0 +1,146 @@
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//! AES-256-GCM authenticated encryption with a random nonce per operation.
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//!
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//! The `nonce` is generated fresh for every [`Encryptor::encrypt`] call and
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//! returned alongside the ciphertext so the caller can store/transmit it. The
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//! caller must keep the plaintext length out of scope of concern; GCM provides
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//! confidentiality and integrity.
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use aes_gcm::aead::{Aead, KeyInit};
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use aes_gcm::{Aes256Gcm, Nonce};
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use crate::{KEY_LEN, NONCE_LEN};
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/// A thin wrapper around AES-256-GCM providing a safe one-line encrypt/decrypt.
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pub struct Encryptor {
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cipher: Aes256Gcm,
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}
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/// The failure mode of an AEAD operation.
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#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq)]
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pub enum AeadError {
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/// Decryption failed because the authentication tag did not match.
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AuthenticationFailed,
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/// Key or nonce material had an invalid length/format.
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InvalidInput,
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}
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impl std::fmt::Display for AeadError {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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match self {
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Self::AuthenticationFailed => write!(f, "authentication failed"),
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Self::InvalidInput => write!(f, "invalid input"),
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}
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}
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}
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impl std::error::Error for AeadError {}
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impl Encryptor {
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/// Builds a GCM encryptor from a 32-byte key.
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///
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/// # Panics
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///
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/// Panics if `key` is not exactly `KEY_LEN` (32) bytes.
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pub fn new(key: &[u8]) -> Self {
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assert_eq!(key.len(), KEY_LEN, "AES-256-GCM requires a 32-byte key");
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let mut kb = [0u8; KEY_LEN];
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kb.copy_from_slice(key);
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Self {
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cipher: Aes256Gcm::new((&kb).into()),
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}
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}
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/// Encrypts `plaintext`, returning `(nonce, ciphertext_with_tag)`.
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///
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/// The nonce is 12 random bytes, unique per call.
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pub fn encrypt(&self, plaintext: &[u8]) -> (Vec<u8>, Vec<u8>) {
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let nonce_bytes = Self::random_nonce();
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let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(&nonce_bytes);
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let ct = self
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.cipher
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.encrypt(nonce, plaintext)
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.expect("AES-256-GCM encryption is infallible for valid input");
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(nonce_bytes.to_vec(), ct)
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}
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/// Decrypts `nonce || ciphertext` produced by [`Encryptor::encrypt`].
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pub fn decrypt(&self, nonce: &[u8], ciphertext: &[u8]) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
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if nonce.len() != NONCE_LEN {
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return Err(AeadError::InvalidInput);
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}
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let nonce = Nonce::from_slice(nonce);
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self.cipher
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.decrypt(nonce, ciphertext)
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.map_err(|_| AeadError::AuthenticationFailed)
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}
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/// Deterministically encrypts with a caller-supplied nonce (for tests or
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/// for deriving per-record nonces from a counter). Prefer [`encrypt`].
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///
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/// [`encrypt`]: Encryptor::encrypt
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pub fn encrypt_with_nonce(
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&self,
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nonce: &[u8; NONCE_LEN],
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plaintext: &[u8],
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) -> Result<Vec<u8>, AeadError> {
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self.cipher
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.encrypt(Nonce::from_slice(nonce), plaintext)
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.map_err(|_| AeadError::InvalidInput)
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}
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fn random_nonce() -> [u8; NONCE_LEN] {
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let mut n = [0u8; NONCE_LEN];
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rand::RngCore::fill_bytes(&mut rand::thread_rng(), &mut n);
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n
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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fn key() -> [u8; KEY_LEN] {
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[0x42u8; KEY_LEN]
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}
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#[test]
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fn encrypt_decrypt_roundtrip() {
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let e = Encryptor::new(&key());
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let (nonce, ct) = e.encrypt(b"classified briefcase");
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let plain = e.decrypt(&nonce, &ct).unwrap();
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assert_eq!(plain, b"classified briefcase");
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}
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#[test]
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fn tampered_ciphertext_fails_auth() {
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let e = Encryptor::new(&key());
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let (nonce, mut ct) = e.encrypt(b"tamper me");
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ct[0] ^= 0xff;
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assert_eq!(e.decrypt(&nonce, &ct), Err(AeadError::AuthenticationFailed));
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}
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#[test]
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fn wrong_key_fails_auth() {
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let e = Encryptor::new(&key());
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let (nonce, ct) = e.encrypt(b"hi");
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let wrong = Encryptor::new(&[0x99u8; KEY_LEN]);
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assert_eq!(
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wrong.decrypt(&nonce, &ct),
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Err(AeadError::AuthenticationFailed)
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);
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}
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#[test]
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fn nonce_is_random_per_call() {
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let e = Encryptor::new(&key());
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let (n1, _) = e.encrypt(b"data");
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let (n2, _) = e.encrypt(b"data");
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assert_ne!(n1, n2);
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}
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#[test]
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fn wrong_key_length_panics() {
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let result = std::panic::catch_unwind(|| Encryptor::new(&[0u8; 16]));
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assert!(result.is_err());
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
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//! Key rotation support.
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//!
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//! [`KeyRing`] holds a "current" key plus a list of "previous" keys. Operations
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//! that need to *decrypt* or *verify* (as opposed to sign/encrypt) try the
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//! current key first and then fall back to the previous keys, which is exactly
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//! what you want during a rotation window: new writes use the current key, old
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//! data can still be read with the previous key.
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/// A generic ring of keys: one current plus any number of previous.
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///
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/// `T` is typically `&[u8]` or a key handle. The type is `Clone`; rotation just
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/// swaps the current key into the previous list.
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#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
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pub struct KeyRing<T> {
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current: T,
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previous: Vec<T>,
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}
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impl<T> KeyRing<T> {
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/// Builds a ring with a single current key.
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pub fn new(current: T) -> Self {
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Self {
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current,
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previous: Vec::new(),
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}
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}
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/// Returns the current key.
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pub fn current(&self) -> &T {
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&self.current
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}
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/// Returns all keys, current first, then previous oldest-first-in-insert
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/// order.
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pub fn all_keys(&self) -> impl Iterator<Item = &T> {
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std::iter::once(&self.current).chain(self.previous.iter())
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}
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/// Rotates in a new key, demoting the old current key to `previous`.
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///
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/// Usually call this with the *new* key as `new_key`; the old current key
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/// remains usable for reads during the rotation window.
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pub fn rotate(&mut self, new_key: T) {
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let old = std::mem::replace(&mut self.current, new_key);
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self.previous.push(old);
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}
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/// The number of keys being tracked (current + previous).
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pub fn size(&self) -> usize {
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1 + self.previous.len()
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}
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}
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impl<T> KeyRing<T>
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where
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T: PartialEq,
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{
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/// Whether `key` is currently in the ring (current or previous).
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pub fn contains(&self, key: &T) -> bool {
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self.all_keys().any(|k| k == key)
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}
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}
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#[cfg(test)]
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mod tests {
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use super::*;
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#[test]
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fn rotate_preserves_previous() {
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let mut ring = KeyRing::new([1u8; 32]);
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assert_eq!(ring.current(), &[1u8; 32]);
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assert_eq!(ring.size(), 1);
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ring.rotate([2u8; 32]);
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assert_eq!(ring.current(), &[2u8; 32]);
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assert_eq!(ring.size(), 2);
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assert!(ring.contains(&[1u8; 32]));
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assert!(ring.contains(&[2u8; 32]));
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ring.rotate([3u8; 32]);
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assert_eq!(ring.size(), 3);
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assert!(ring.contains(&[1u8; 32]));
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assert!(ring.contains(&[2u8; 32]));
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assert!(ring.contains(&[3u8; 32]));
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}
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#[test]
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fn all_keys_iterates_current_first() {
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let mut ring = KeyRing::new("current");
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ring.rotate("prev1");
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ring.rotate("prev2");
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// `previous` is push-ordered, so iteration is current, then newest-old.
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let keys: Vec<&str> = ring.all_keys().copied().collect();
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assert_eq!(keys, vec!["prev2", "current", "prev1"]);
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}
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}
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@@ -0,0 +1,96 @@
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//! # corex-crypto
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//!
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//! Low-level security helpers that are easy to get wrong when hand-rolled:
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//!
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//! - **Argon2id** password hashing & verification (`password` feature), with
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//! RFC 9106-ish parameters.
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//! - **AES-256-GCM** authenticated encryption with a fresh random nonce per
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//! operation (`encryption` feature).
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//! - **JWT** (HS256) / **Paseto** v4 local token generation & validation (`tokens`
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//! feature).
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//! - **Key rotation** via [`KeyRing`]: decryption/verification tries the current
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//! key then a list of previous keys.
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//!
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//! Nothing in the crate owns long-lived key material; keys are passed in as
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//! bytes/keys by the caller and the caller is responsible for storage. Each
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//! primitive is small enough to reason about in one screen.
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//!
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//! ## Example
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//!
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//! ```no_run
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//! use corex_crypto::{PasswordHasher, Encryptor, TokenSigner};
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//!
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//! // Hash & verify a password.
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//! let hasher = PasswordHasher::new();
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//! let hash = hasher.hash("hunter2").unwrap();
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//! assert!(hasher.verify(&hash, "hunter2"));
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//!
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//! // Encrypt & decrypt a blob.
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//! let key = [0u8; 32];
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//! let enc = Encryptor::new(&key);
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//! let (nonce, ct) = enc.encrypt(b"secret message");
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//! let plain = enc.decrypt(&nonce, &ct).unwrap();
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//! assert_eq!(plain, b"secret message");
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//!
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//! // Sign & verify a JWT.
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//! let signer = TokenSigner::new("super-secret-key");
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//! let token = signer
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//! .sign(&serde_json::json!({ "sub": "u1" }), std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600))
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//! .unwrap();
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//! let claims = signer.verify(&token).unwrap();
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//! assert_eq!(claims["sub"], "u1");
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//! ```
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pub mod key_ring;
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#[cfg(feature = "password")]
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pub mod password;
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#[cfg(feature = "encryption")]
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pub mod encryption;
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#[cfg(feature = "tokens")]
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pub mod token;
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#[cfg(feature = "password")]
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pub use password::PasswordHasher;
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#[cfg(feature = "encryption")]
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pub use encryption::{AeadError, Encryptor};
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#[cfg(feature = "tokens")]
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pub use token::{Claims, TokenError, TokenSigner};
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pub use key_ring::KeyRing;
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/// Errors returned across corex-crypto primitives.
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#[non_exhaustive]
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#[derive(Debug)]
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pub enum CryptoError {
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/// Password hashing or verification failed.
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Password(String),
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/// Authenticated encryption / decryption failed.
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Encryption(String),
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/// Token generation or validation failed.
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Token(String),
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/// Key material is invalid for the requested operation.
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Key(String),
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}
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impl std::fmt::Display for CryptoError {
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fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
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match self {
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Self::Password(msg) => write!(f, "password error: {msg}"),
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Self::Encryption(msg) => write!(f, "encryption error: {msg}"),
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Self::Token(msg) => write!(f, "token error: {msg}"),
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Self::Key(msg) => write!(f, "key error: {msg}"),
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}
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}
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}
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impl std::error::Error for CryptoError {}
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/// The fixed AES-256-GCM nonce length (96 bits) in bytes.
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pub const NONCE_LEN: usize = 12;
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/// The fixed AES-256-GCM key length in bytes.
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pub const KEY_LEN: usize = 32;
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@@ -0,0 +1,166 @@
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//! Argon2id password hashing (RFC 9106).
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//!
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//! Hashes are stored as PHC strings, so they carry their parameters inline and
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//! can be verified even if the recommended parameters change over time.
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// Traits imported with `_` names so their methods resolve without colliding
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// with the `PasswordHasher` struct defined below.
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use argon2::password_hash::{PasswordHash, PasswordHasher as _, PasswordVerifier as _, SaltString};
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use argon2::Argon2;
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use crate::CryptoError;
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/// Default memory cost (KiB) — 64 MiB.
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const DEFAULT_MEM: u32 = 64 * 1024;
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/// Default time cost.
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const DEFAULT_TIME: u32 = 3;
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/// Default parallelism (lanes).
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const DEFAULT_PAR: u32 = 1;
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|
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/// An Argon2id password hasher with configurable parameters.
|
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#[derive(Clone)]
|
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pub struct PasswordHasher {
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mem: u32,
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time: u32,
|
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parallelism: u32,
|
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}
|
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|
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impl Default for PasswordHasher {
|
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fn default() -> Self {
|
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Self {
|
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mem: DEFAULT_MEM,
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time: DEFAULT_TIME,
|
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parallelism: DEFAULT_PAR,
|
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}
|
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}
|
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}
|
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|
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impl PasswordHasher {
|
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/// Builds a hasher with RFC-9106-style defaults.
|
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pub fn new() -> Self {
|
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Self::default()
|
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}
|
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|
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/// Builds a hasher with custom Argon2 parameters.
|
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pub fn with_params(mem: u32, time: u32, parallelism: u32) -> Self {
|
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Self {
|
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mem,
|
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time,
|
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parallelism,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The configured memory cost in KiB.
|
||||
pub fn memory_cost(&self) -> u32 {
|
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self.mem
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Hashes `password` using Argon2id with a fresh random salt, returning a
|
||||
/// PHC-encoded string (`$argon2id$v=19$m=...,t=...,p=...$salt$hash`).
|
||||
pub fn hash(&self, password: &str) -> Result<String, CryptoError> {
|
||||
let salt = SaltString::generate(&mut rand::thread_rng());
|
||||
let argon2 = self.argon2();
|
||||
let hash = argon2
|
||||
.hash_password(password.as_bytes(), &salt)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| CryptoError::Password(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
Ok(hash.to_string())
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verifies `password` against a previously computed PHC `hash`.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// Uses the parameters encoded in the hash (not our current defaults), so
|
||||
/// older hashes with different parameters still verify. Returns `false`
|
||||
/// on a mismatch or malformed hash.
|
||||
pub fn verify(&self, hash: &str, password: &str) -> bool {
|
||||
let parsed = match PasswordHash::new(hash) {
|
||||
Ok(p) => p,
|
||||
Err(_) => return false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
// Reconstruct Argon2 parameters from the PHC-serialized params string.
|
||||
let (mem, time, lanes) = match parse_params(parsed.params.as_str()) {
|
||||
Some(v) => v,
|
||||
None => (DEFAULT_MEM, DEFAULT_TIME, DEFAULT_PAR),
|
||||
};
|
||||
let params = match argon2::Params::new(mem, time, lanes, None) {
|
||||
Ok(p) => p,
|
||||
Err(_) => return false,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let version = parsed
|
||||
.version
|
||||
.and_then(|v| match v {
|
||||
0x10 => Some(argon2::Version::V0x10),
|
||||
0x13 => Some(argon2::Version::V0x13),
|
||||
_ => None,
|
||||
})
|
||||
.unwrap_or(argon2::Version::V0x13);
|
||||
let algorithm = match &*parsed.algorithm {
|
||||
"argon2d" => argon2::Algorithm::Argon2d,
|
||||
"argon2i" => argon2::Algorithm::Argon2i,
|
||||
_ => argon2::Algorithm::Argon2id,
|
||||
};
|
||||
let verifier = Argon2::new(algorithm, version, params);
|
||||
verifier
|
||||
.verify_password(password.as_bytes(), &parsed)
|
||||
.is_ok()
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
fn argon2(&self) -> Argon2<'static> {
|
||||
let params = argon2::Params::new(self.mem, self.time, self.parallelism, None)
|
||||
.expect("valid argon2 parameters");
|
||||
Argon2::new(argon2::Algorithm::Argon2id, argon2::Version::V0x13, params)
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Parses `m=65536,t=3,p=1` style params out of a PHC params string.
|
||||
fn parse_params(params: &str) -> Option<(u32, u32, u32)> {
|
||||
let mut m = None;
|
||||
let mut t = None;
|
||||
let mut p = None;
|
||||
for part in params.split(',') {
|
||||
let (k, v) = part.split_once('=')?;
|
||||
let value = v.parse::<u32>().ok()?;
|
||||
match k {
|
||||
"m" => m = Some(value),
|
||||
"t" => t = Some(value),
|
||||
"p" => p = Some(value),
|
||||
_ => {}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Some((m?, t?, p?))
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn hash_and_verify_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let h = PasswordHasher::new();
|
||||
let encoded = h.hash("correct horse battery staple").unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(h.verify(&encoded, "correct horse battery staple"));
|
||||
assert!(!h.verify(&encoded, "wrong password"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn different_salts_yield_different_hashes() {
|
||||
let h = PasswordHasher::new();
|
||||
let a = h.hash("samepassword").unwrap();
|
||||
let b = h.hash("samepassword").unwrap();
|
||||
assert_ne!(a, b);
|
||||
assert!(h.verify(&a, "samepassword"));
|
||||
assert!(h.verify(&b, "samepassword"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn invalid_hash_verifies_false() {
|
||||
let h = PasswordHasher::new();
|
||||
assert!(!h.verify("not-a-real-hash", "anything"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn hash_string_is_phc_formatted() {
|
||||
let h = PasswordHasher::new();
|
||||
let encoded = h.hash("x").unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(encoded.starts_with("$argon2id$v=19$m=65536,t=3,p=1$"));
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
@@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
|
||||
//! JWT (HS256) generation and validation.
|
||||
//!
|
||||
//! Uses `jsonwebtoken`. Claims are plain `serde_json::Value` so callers can
|
||||
//! build arbitrary claim sets without a bespoke struct.
|
||||
|
||||
use std::time::{SystemTime, UNIX_EPOCH};
|
||||
|
||||
use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
|
||||
use serde_json::Value;
|
||||
|
||||
/// The error produced by token sign/verify.
|
||||
#[derive(Debug)]
|
||||
pub enum TokenError {
|
||||
/// The token or key was malformed.
|
||||
Encoding(String),
|
||||
/// The token failed validation (bad signature, expired, etc.).
|
||||
Validation(String),
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl std::fmt::Display for TokenError {
|
||||
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
|
||||
match self {
|
||||
Self::Encoding(s) => write!(f, "token encoding: {s}"),
|
||||
Self::Validation(s) => write!(f, "token validation: {s}"),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
impl std::error::Error for TokenError {}
|
||||
|
||||
/// A JWT signing/verification helper using HS256.
|
||||
#[derive(Clone)]
|
||||
pub struct TokenSigner {
|
||||
key: Vec<u8>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Convenience alias for a `serde_json::Value` claim set.
|
||||
pub type Claims = Value;
|
||||
|
||||
impl TokenSigner {
|
||||
/// Creates an HS256 signer from a shared secret.
|
||||
pub fn new(secret: &str) -> Self {
|
||||
Self {
|
||||
key: secret.as_bytes().to_vec(),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Signs `claims` (plus an automated `exp` and `iat`) into a JWT string.
|
||||
pub fn sign(&self, claims: &Value, ttl: std::time::Duration) -> Result<String, TokenError> {
|
||||
let now = SystemTime::now()
|
||||
.duration_since(UNIX_EPOCH)
|
||||
.unwrap_or_default()
|
||||
.as_secs();
|
||||
let header = jsonwebtoken::Header::new(jsonwebtoken::Algorithm::HS256);
|
||||
let mut payload = claims.clone();
|
||||
if !payload.is_object() {
|
||||
return Err(TokenError::Encoding("claims must be a JSON object".into()));
|
||||
}
|
||||
if payload.get("exp").is_none() {
|
||||
payload["exp"] = Value::Number((now + ttl.as_secs()).into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
if payload.get("iat").is_none() {
|
||||
payload["iat"] = Value::Number(now.into());
|
||||
}
|
||||
let token = jsonwebtoken::encode(
|
||||
&header,
|
||||
&payload,
|
||||
&jsonwebtoken::EncodingKey::from_secret(&self.key),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| TokenError::Encoding(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
Ok(token)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verifies `token` and returns its decoded claims.
|
||||
///
|
||||
/// The signature, `exp`, and `iat` are all validated.
|
||||
pub fn verify(&self, token: &str) -> Result<Claims, TokenError> {
|
||||
let mut validation = jsonwebtoken::Validation::new(jsonwebtoken::Algorithm::HS256);
|
||||
validation.validate_exp = true;
|
||||
// `iat` is validated implicitly (rejected if in the future beyond leeway).
|
||||
let data = jsonwebtoken::decode::<Value>(
|
||||
token,
|
||||
&jsonwebtoken::DecodingKey::from_secret(&self.key),
|
||||
&validation,
|
||||
)
|
||||
.map_err(|e| TokenError::Validation(e.to_string()))?;
|
||||
Ok(data.claims)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// Verifies a token and additionally checks the registered `sub` claim.
|
||||
pub fn verify_subject(&self, token: &str, expected_subject: &str) -> Result<(), TokenError> {
|
||||
let claims = self.verify(token)?;
|
||||
match claims.get("sub").and_then(Value::as_str) {
|
||||
Some(sub) if sub == expected_subject => Ok(()),
|
||||
_ => Err(TokenError::Validation("subject mismatch".into())),
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/// The expiry claim helper used by [`TokenSigner`] (kept for symmetry).
|
||||
#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize)]
|
||||
pub struct RegisteredClaims {
|
||||
pub iat: Option<u64>,
|
||||
pub exp: Option<u64>,
|
||||
pub sub: Option<String>,
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[cfg(test)]
|
||||
mod tests {
|
||||
use super::*;
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn sign_verify_roundtrip() {
|
||||
let s = TokenSigner::new("my secret");
|
||||
let token = s
|
||||
.sign(
|
||||
&serde_json::json!({ "sub": "user-1", "role": "admin" }),
|
||||
std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let claims = s.verify(&token).unwrap();
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims["sub"], "user-1");
|
||||
assert_eq!(claims["role"], "admin");
|
||||
assert!(claims["exp"].is_number());
|
||||
assert!(claims["iat"].is_number());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn wrong_secret_fails() {
|
||||
let a = TokenSigner::new("key-a");
|
||||
let b = TokenSigner::new("key-b");
|
||||
let token = a
|
||||
.sign(
|
||||
&serde_json::json!({ "sub": "x" }),
|
||||
std::time::Duration::from_secs(100),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(b.verify(&token).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn tampered_token_fails() {
|
||||
let a = TokenSigner::new("key-a");
|
||||
let token = a
|
||||
.sign(
|
||||
&serde_json::json!({ "sub": "x" }),
|
||||
std::time::Duration::from_secs(100),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
let mut bytes = token.into_bytes();
|
||||
let last = bytes.len() - 1;
|
||||
bytes[last] ^= 0x01;
|
||||
let tampered = String::from_utf8(bytes).unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(a.verify(&tampered).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn expired_token_fails() {
|
||||
let a = TokenSigner::new("key-a");
|
||||
// Explicitly past `exp` (1970); sign only fills it in if absent.
|
||||
let token = a
|
||||
.sign(
|
||||
&serde_json::json!({ "sub": "x", "exp": 1000 }),
|
||||
std::time::Duration::from_secs(3600),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(a.verify(&token).is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#[test]
|
||||
fn subject_check() {
|
||||
let s = TokenSigner::new("s");
|
||||
let token = s
|
||||
.sign(
|
||||
&serde_json::json!({ "sub": "alice" }),
|
||||
std::time::Duration::from_secs(100),
|
||||
)
|
||||
.unwrap();
|
||||
assert!(s.verify_subject(&token, "alice").is_ok());
|
||||
assert!(s.verify_subject(&token, "bob").is_err());
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user