Files
attack-defense-platform/receiver/challenges/Phew.py
T
Cyrene ae50acfe40 fix(ssh): per-challenge SSH login + phew buffering/leak/timeout
Passwords failed on 10/16 challenges while state.json looked correct:
- only the 6 native GEMASTIK XVIII images provision 'ctfuser'; every imported
  XVI/XVII image does 'echo root:${PASSWORD} | chpasswd' and logs in as root.
  set_ssh_passwords() hardcoded ctfuser, so chpasswd set a password on an
  account nobody uses -> 'Permission denied' everywhere.
  Registry gains a per-challenge 'ssh_user'; chpasswd now targets the real
  login (and ctfuser/ctf when present) and reports failures loudly.
- phew checker: chall.py block-buffers stdout through the docker exec pipe
  (PYTHONUNBUFFERED now set) and leaks chall.py inside the container on
  timeout (26 orphans, container saturated) -> reaps the whole exec process
  group. Startup does a fresh Pailier keygen (~12 s) so crypto reads need
  _CRYPTO_TIMEOUT, not the 5 s prompt default.

Adds panel/verify_ssh_creds.py (proves the state->container binding from
inside via a real login), audit_ssh_users.sh, reset_runtime.sh.
2026-09-26 14:40:10 +08:00

289 lines
12 KiB
Python

from .Challenge import Challenge
import select
import subprocess
import time
import re
import os
def _has_data(proc) -> bool:
"""True if the child's pipe still holds buffered output."""
import fcntl
try:
fd = proc.stdout.fileno()
fl = fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_GETFL)
fcntl.fcntl(fd, fcntl.F_SETFL, fl | os.O_NONBLOCK)
data = proc.stdout.read()
if data:
return True
return False
except Exception:
return False
class Phew(Challenge):
flag_location = 'flags/phew.txt'
history_location = 'history/phew.txt'
# Live `docker exec` sessions for this checker instance, so a failed or
# timed-out check can reap the remote process instead of leaking it.
_children = []
_CONTAINER = os.environ.get("CHALLENGE_CONTAINER_PHEW", "phew_container")
# PYTHONUNBUFFERED is mandatory: chall.py prints its menu to stdout, and the
# checker reads that pipe interactively. Python block-buffers stdout when it
# is not a tty, so without it the child never flushes the "1. encrypt ... > "
# banner and the checker's very first read times out — every time, even on a
# perfectly healthy service. `python3 -u` would do the same thing.
_SERVICE_CMD = ["docker", "exec", "-i", "-e", "PYTHONUNBUFFERED=1",
_CONTAINER, "python3", "/home/ctfuser/chall/src/chall.py"]
_HEX_RE = re.compile(r'^[0-9a-fA-F]+$')
# chall.py generates a fresh Pailier keypair (os.urandom(66) + RSA keygen)
# BEFORE it prints the menu, which measures ~12 s on this host. The first
# read must outlast that or the check fails on a healthy service. Later
# exchanges reuse the same key, so they can stay short.
_BOOT_TIMEOUT = 45.0
# Budget for a single cipher operation. Encrypting the raw 528-bit key
# (menu option 4) is measurably slower than encrypting a small plaintext,
# and a saturated host makes even the small ones slower — 5 s was too tight
# and produced a false DOWN.
_CRYPTO_TIMEOUT = 30.0
def _read_container_flag(self) -> str:
# NB: a timeout is mandatory here. `docker exec` against a container
# whose process table is saturated (accumulated chall.py zombies) can
# block forever and take the whole SLA check loop down with it.
try:
out = subprocess.run(["docker", "exec", self._CONTAINER, "cat", "/flag.txt"],
capture_output=True, text=True, timeout=30)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
raise TimeoutError("docker exec cat /flag.txt timed out (container overloaded?)")
if out.returncode != 0 or not out.stdout.strip():
raise FileNotFoundError("Flag not found in container (/flag.txt)")
return out.stdout.strip()
def _spawn(self):
proc = subprocess.Popen(
self._SERVICE_CMD,
stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
stdout=subprocess.PIPE,
stderr=subprocess.STDOUT,
text=True,
bufsize=0,
)
self._children.append(proc)
return proc
def _reap(self, proc):
"""Kill a spawned service session, INSIDE the container too.
proc.kill() only kills the local `docker exec` CLIENT. The chall.py it
launched keeps running in the container, so a timed-out check leaked a
live process. After a few failures the container had 26 concurrent
chall.py instances, each burning CPU in Paillier math, which starved the
remaining checks and turned a slow service into a permanently DOWN one.
Reaping must therefore also pkill the remote process.
"""
if proc.poll() is None:
try:
proc.kill()
proc.wait(timeout=5)
except Exception:
pass
try:
subprocess.run(["docker", "exec", self._CONTAINER, "sh", "-c",
"pkill -f chall.py 2>/dev/null || true"],
capture_output=True, timeout=20)
except Exception:
pass
if proc in self._children:
self._children.remove(proc)
def _reap_all(self):
for p in list(self._children):
self._reap(p)
def _read_until(self, proc, token, timeout=5.0, max_bytes=1_000_000):
"""Read until `token` appears, honoring `timeout` even when the child
goes silent.
The previous implementation used a blocking `stdout.read(1)` in a
loop and only checked the deadline BETWEEN characters, so a child that
printed nothing made the call block forever — the timeout never fired
and the check loop hung instead of failing fast. select() makes the
deadline authoritative.
"""
start = time.time()
buf = []
deadline = start + timeout
while True:
if time.time() > deadline:
tail = ''.join(buf)[-500:]
raise TimeoutError(f"Timeout waiting for '{token}'. Got so far:\n{tail}")
remaining = deadline - time.time()
ready, _, _ = select.select([proc.stdout], [], [], min(remaining, 1.0))
if not ready:
if proc.poll() is not None and not _has_data(proc):
raise RuntimeError(
f"Process ended while waiting for '{token}'. Output:\n{''.join(buf)}")
continue
ch = proc.stdout.read(1)
if ch == "":
raise RuntimeError(
f"Process ended while waiting for '{token}'. Output:\n{''.join(buf)}")
buf.append(ch)
if len(buf) > max_bytes:
raise RuntimeError("Exceeded max read size")
if token in "".join(buf):
return "".join(buf)
def _send_line(self, proc, s: str):
proc.stdin.write(s + "\n")
proc.stdin.flush()
def _expect_hex_field(self, text: str, label: str) -> str:
m = re.search(rf"{re.escape(label)}\s*:\s*([0-9a-fA-F]+)", text)
assert m, f"Missing '{label}' in output. Tail:\n{text[-400:]}"
hx = m.group(1)
assert self._HEX_RE.match(hx), f"{label} is not hex"
return hx
def distribute(self, flag):
try:
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(self.flag_location), exist_ok=True)
with open(self.flag_location, 'w') as f:
f.write(flag)
os.makedirs(os.path.dirname(self.history_location), exist_ok=True)
with open(self.history_location, 'a') as f:
f.write(flag + '\n')
self.logger.info(f'Flag {flag} written to {self.flag_location}')
return True
except Exception as e:
self.logger.error(f'Could not write flag to {self.flag_location}: {e}')
return False
def check(self):
try:
# parity check
with open(self.flag_location, 'r') as f:
host_flag = f.read().strip()
container_flag = self._read_container_flag()
assert host_flag == container_flag, 'Flag mismatch between host and container'
self.logger.info('[ok] flag parity (phew)')
def run_encrypt_once(pt_hex: str) -> str:
proc = self._spawn()
try:
self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=self._BOOT_TIMEOUT)
self._send_line(proc, "1")
self._read_until(proc, "pt (hex)", timeout=3.0)
self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=3.0)
self._send_line(proc, pt_hex)
out = self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=self._CRYPTO_TIMEOUT)
ct_hex = self._expect_hex_field(out, "ct")
self._send_line(proc, "9")
try:
proc.wait(timeout=2.0)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
proc.kill()
raise AssertionError("Program did not exit after exit command (encrypt)")
return ct_hex
finally:
self._reap(proc)
def run_decrypt_once(ct_hex: str) -> str:
proc = self._spawn()
try:
self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=self._BOOT_TIMEOUT)
self._send_line(proc, "3")
self._read_until(proc, "ct (hex)", timeout=3.0)
self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=3.0)
self._send_line(proc, ct_hex)
out = self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=self._CRYPTO_TIMEOUT)
pt_hex = self._expect_hex_field(out, "pt")
self._send_line(proc, "9")
try:
proc.wait(timeout=2.0)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
proc.kill()
raise AssertionError("Program did not exit after exit command (decrypt)")
return pt_hex
finally:
self._reap(proc)
def run_keyct_once() -> str:
proc = self._spawn()
try:
self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=self._BOOT_TIMEOUT)
self._send_line(proc, "4")
# Option 4 runs `cipher.encrypt(key_int)` on the raw 528-bit
# key — a fresh Paillier encryption on a much larger operand
# than the small plaintexts above, so it costs noticeably
# longer than a normal exchange. A 5 s budget is not enough
# on this host and the check fails on a healthy service.
out = self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=self._CRYPTO_TIMEOUT)
ct_hex = self._expect_hex_field(out, "ct")
self._send_line(proc, "9")
try:
proc.wait(timeout=2.0)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
proc.kill()
raise AssertionError("Program did not exit after exit command (keyct)")
return ct_hex
finally:
self._reap(proc)
def run_bingo_reject_wrong_key():
wrong_key_hex = "00" * 66
proc = self._spawn()
try:
self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=self._BOOT_TIMEOUT)
self._send_line(proc, "2")
self._read_until(proc, "key (hex)", timeout=3.0)
self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=3.0)
self._send_line(proc, wrong_key_hex)
out = self._read_until(proc, "> ", timeout=self._CRYPTO_TIMEOUT)
assert "nope" in out.lower(), f"bingo did not reject wrong key; got:\n{out[-300:]}"
self._send_line(proc, "9")
try:
proc.wait(timeout=2.0)
except subprocess.TimeoutExpired:
proc.kill()
raise AssertionError("Program did not exit after exit command (bingo)")
finally:
self._reap(proc)
ct1 = run_encrypt_once("414243444546")
assert ct1 and self._HEX_RE.match(ct1), "encrypt(1) did not return hex"
self.logger.info("[ok] encrypt produced hex")
pt_back = run_decrypt_once(ct1)
assert pt_back.strip() != "", "decrypt returned empty output"
assert self._HEX_RE.match(pt_back), "decrypt(3) did not return hex"
self.logger.info("[ok] decrypt produced hex (custom mapping accepted)")
pt_same = "01" * 8
ct_a = run_encrypt_once(pt_same)
ct_b = run_encrypt_once(pt_same)
assert ct_a.lower() != ct_b.lower(), "Encryption appears deterministic for same plaintext"
self.logger.info("[ok] encrypt randomness")
k1 = run_keyct_once()
k2 = run_keyct_once()
assert k1.lower() != k2.lower(), "key? ciphertexts reused randomness"
self.logger.info("[ok] key? randomness")
# run_bingo_reject_wrong_key()
# self.logger.info("[ok] bingo rejects wrong key")
return True
except Exception as e:
self.logger.error(f'Could not check phew: {e}')
return False
finally:
# never leave a spawned chall.py behind, whatever happened above
self._reap_all()