refactor(fase0): shared scaffold — crypto, file-url, schemas, test splits

- Add zod dep; new src/shared/validation/schemas.ts (BucketName,
  JsonUploadPayload, LoginBody, DeleteObjects, CompleteMultipart,
  clampMaxKeys, parseOrNull) + test/validation.test.ts
- Dedup timingSafeCompare -> src/shared/utils/crypto.ts (auth
  middleware, authenticate use-case, s3/auth now import it)
- Dedup AuthSession -> single type in dto/auth.ts
- Dedup telegram file URL builder + filename sanitizer to shared
  modules (file-controller now imports the canonical ones)
- Remove duplicate controllers/home.html (canonical: src/home.html)
- Fix stale bootstrap mocks to real module paths; bootstrap now
  asserts public GET vs guarded POST separately
- Fix health assertion to include version field
- package.json: test -> test:unit alias; new test:quarantine for
  network/live tests; register previously unlisted test files
This commit is contained in:
asepharyana
2026-09-14 17:09:52 +07:00
parent f4b30cef0c
commit 5d01a9405f
16 changed files with 511 additions and 473 deletions
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@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import { timingSafeCompare } from '../../shared/utils/crypto';
import type {
AuthSession,
LoginInput,
@@ -23,24 +23,6 @@ export interface AuthenticateUseCaseDeps {
config: AuthUseCaseConfig;
}
/**
* Performs a constant-time string comparison to prevent timing attacks.
*
* @param left - The first string to compare.
* @param right - The second string to compare.
* @returns `true` if the strings are equal, `false` otherwise.
*/
const timingSafeCompare = (left: string, right: string): boolean => {
const leftBuffer = Buffer.from(left);
const rightBuffer = Buffer.from(right);
if (leftBuffer.length !== rightBuffer.length) {
return false;
}
return timingSafeEqual(leftBuffer, rightBuffer);
};
/**
* Checks whether authentication is enabled based on the configured token.
*
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@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
/**
* Builds a Telegram CDN download URL from a file path and bot token.
*
* Single canonical implementation — previously constructed inline in
* `interfaces/http/controllers/file-controller.ts`,
* `interfaces/http/controllers/web-api-controller.ts`,
* `interfaces/http/controllers/s3-controller.ts`, and
* `infrastructure/telegram/chunked-storage.ts`.
*
* NOTE: URLs produced here embed the bot token. They must only be used
* server-side (outbound fetch to the Telegram CDN), never exposed to
* clients in redirects or response bodies.
*
* @param filePath - The Telegram file path returned by getFile.
* @param botToken - The bot token used to authenticate the download.
* @returns The full Telegram CDN URL.
*/
export const buildTelegramFileUrl = (filePath: string, botToken: string): string =>
`https://api.telegram.org/file/bot${botToken}/${filePath}`;
@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ import type { TelegramFileInfo } from '../../../domain/ports/telegram-service';
import { fileInfoCache } from '../../../infrastructure/cache/index';
import { chunkedStorage, fileRepository } from '../../../infrastructure/di';
import { botPool } from '../../../infrastructure/telegram/bot-pool';
import { buildTelegramFileUrl } from '../../../infrastructure/telegram/file-url';
import { sanitizeFilenameHeader } from '../../../shared/http/filename';
import logger from '../../../shared/logger/index';
import { cleanupTempFile, formatCreatedAt, getErrorMessage } from '../../../shared/utils/file';
import { locateZipEntry } from '../../../shared/utils/zip';
@@ -46,26 +48,6 @@ const getTelegramFileInfo = async (
return fileInfo;
};
/**
* Builds a Telegram CDN download URL from a file path and bot token.
*
* @param filePath - The Telegram file path returned by getFile.
* @param botToken - The bot token used to authenticate the download.
* @returns The full Telegram CDN URL.
*/
const buildTelegramFileUrl = (filePath: string, botToken: string): string =>
`https://api.telegram.org/file/bot${botToken}/${filePath}`;
/**
* Sanitises a file name for use in a Content-Disposition header, removing
* characters that could enable header injection.
*
* @param fileName - The raw file name.
* @returns The sanitised file name.
*/
const sanitizeFilenameHeader = (fileName: string): string =>
fileName.replace(/[\\"]/g, '').replace(/[\n\r]/g, '');
/**
* Returns a JSON error response with the given status code and message.
*
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+4 -30
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@@ -1,5 +1,6 @@
import { createHmac, timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
import { createHmac } from 'node:crypto';
import { config } from '../../../env';
import { timingSafeCompare } from '../../../shared/utils/crypto';
const ADMIN_USERNAME = 'admin';
const SIGNATURE_SEPARATOR = '.';
@@ -11,17 +12,7 @@ type Handler = (req: Request) => Response | Promise<Response>;
* Represents an authenticated user session after successful
* authentication via cookie or bearer token.
*/
export interface AuthSession {
/** The authenticated username (always "admin" in this implementation). */
username: string;
/**
* Expiration date of the session, or `null` for bearer-token
* sessions which do not expire at the session level.
*/
expiresAt: Date | null;
/** The authentication method used to establish this session. */
method: 'cookie' | 'bearer';
}
export type { AuthSession } from '../../../application/dto/auth';
/** Options for configuring cookie-based session behaviour. */
interface CookieOptions {
@@ -64,24 +55,7 @@ const decodePayload = (value: string): string | null => {
*/
export const isAuthEnabled = (secret = config.adminApiToken): boolean => secret.length > 0;
/**
* Compares two strings using a timing-safe algorithm to prevent
* timing side-channel attacks.
*
* @param left - First string to compare.
* @param right - Second string to compare.
* @returns `true` when the strings are equal, `false` otherwise.
*/
export const timingSafeCompare = (left: string, right: string): boolean => {
const leftBuffer = Buffer.from(left);
const rightBuffer = Buffer.from(right);
if (leftBuffer.length !== rightBuffer.length) {
return false;
}
return timingSafeEqual(leftBuffer, rightBuffer);
};
export { timingSafeCompare } from '../../../shared/utils/crypto';
/**
* Signs an arbitrary payload string with HMAC-SHA256 using the given
+1 -23
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@@ -1,26 +1,4 @@
import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
/**
* Timing-safe string comparison that prevents timing attacks.
*
* Uses `crypto.timingSafeEqual` which runs in constant time regardless of
* where the strings differ. Returns false for mismatched-length inputs
* to avoid leaking length information via early return.
*
* @param left - The first string to compare.
* @param right - The second string to compare.
* @returns True if both strings are equal.
*/
const timingSafeCompare = (left: string, right: string): boolean => {
const leftBuffer = Buffer.from(left);
const rightBuffer = Buffer.from(right);
if (leftBuffer.length !== rightBuffer.length) {
return false;
}
return timingSafeEqual(leftBuffer, rightBuffer);
};
import { timingSafeCompare } from '../../shared/utils/crypto';
export interface SigV4Result {
isValid: boolean;
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@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
/**
* Sanitises a file name for use in a Content-Disposition header, removing
* characters that could enable header injection.
*
* Single canonical implementation — previously only present in
* `interfaces/http/controllers/file-controller.ts` while other download
* paths (S3 GET, web-api) did not sanitise at all.
*
* @param fileName - The raw file name.
* @returns The sanitised file name.
*/
export const sanitizeFilenameHeader = (fileName: string): string =>
fileName.replace(/[\\"]/g, '').replace(/[\n\r]/g, '');
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@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
import { timingSafeEqual } from 'node:crypto';
/**
* Compares two strings using a timing-safe algorithm to prevent
* timing side-channel attacks.
*
* Single canonical implementation — replaces the three copies that
* previously lived in `interfaces/http/middleware/auth.ts`,
* `application/use-cases/authenticate.ts`, and `interfaces/s3/auth.ts`.
*
* @param left - First string to compare.
* @param right - Second string to compare.
* @returns `true` when the strings are equal, `false` otherwise.
*/
export const timingSafeCompare = (left: string, right: string): boolean => {
const leftBuffer = Buffer.from(left);
const rightBuffer = Buffer.from(right);
if (leftBuffer.length !== rightBuffer.length) {
return false;
}
return timingSafeEqual(leftBuffer, rightBuffer);
};
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@@ -0,0 +1,161 @@
import { z } from 'zod';
/**
* Boundary validation schemas (zod) for all system entry points.
*
* Every HTTP/S3/bot boundary parses untrusted input through one of these
* schemas before touching domain logic. Controllers map a failed parse to
* the transport-appropriate error (400 JSON / S3 XML error) — see
* `parseOrNull` usage at each call site.
*
* @module shared/validation/schemas
*/
/**
* S3 bucket name — the single canonical validator.
*
* Replaces three divergent variants: the inline regex in s3-controller
* (`handleCreateBucket`), `BUCKET_NAME_REGEX` in
* `application/use-cases/manage-bucket.ts`, and `isValidBucketLabel` in
* `interfaces/s3/virtual-host.ts`.
*
* Rules: 3–63 chars, lowercase letters/digits/dots/hyphens, start/end with
* letter-or-digit, plus the stricter M13 rules (no consecutive dots, no IP
* format, no `xn--` prefix).
*/
export const BucketNameSchema = z
.string()
.min(3)
.max(63)
.regex(/^[a-z0-9][a-z0-9.-]{1,61}[a-z0-9]$/, 'Bucket name has invalid format')
.refine((name) => !name.includes('..'), 'Bucket name must not contain consecutive dots')
.refine(
(name) => !/^\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}\.\d{1,3}$/.test(name),
'Bucket name must not be formatted as an IP address',
)
.refine((name) => !name.startsWith('xn--'), 'Bucket name must not start with "xn--"');
/** Inferred bucket-name type. */
export type BucketName = z.infer<typeof BucketNameSchema>;
/**
* JSON upload endpoint body (`POST /api/upload` with
* `Content-Type: application/json`).
*
* Replaces the bare `as JsonUploadPayload` cast in
* `interfaces/http/controllers/upload-controller.ts`.
*/
export const JsonUploadPayloadSchema = z.object({
/** Base64-encoded file data, optionally with a `data:` URI prefix. */
file: z.string().min(1, 'Invalid JSON. Must include "file" (base64) and optional "fileName"'),
/** Optional file name. */
fileName: z.string().default('file'),
});
/** Inferred JSON-upload payload type. */
export type JsonUploadPayload = z.infer<typeof JsonUploadPayloadSchema>;
/**
* Login endpoint body (`POST /api/v1/auth/login`).
*
* Replaces the manual `typeof token` check in `readLoginBody`
* (`interfaces/http/controllers/auth-controller.ts`).
*/
export const LoginBodySchema = z.object({
/** Admin API token. */
token: z.string().min(1, 'Token is required'),
});
/** Inferred login-body type. */
export type LoginBody = z.infer<typeof LoginBodySchema>;
/** A single key entry in an S3 DeleteObjects (`?delete`) XML body. */
export const DeleteObjectKeySchema = z.string().min(1);
/**
* S3 multi-object delete body (`POST /{bucket}?delete`).
*
* Validates the *parsed* output of `parseDeleteObjectsBody` (`interfaces/s3/xml.ts`).
* The regex parser is kept (low-risk), its output is validated here — including
* the M11 S3 limit of 1000 keys per request.
*/
export const DeleteObjectsBodySchema = z.object({
/** Object keys to delete. */
keys: z.array(DeleteObjectKeySchema).max(1000, 'Max 1000 keys per request'),
/** Quiet mode — return only errors. */
quiet: z.boolean(),
});
/** Inferred delete-objects body type. */
export type DeleteObjectsBody = z.infer<typeof DeleteObjectsBodySchema>;
/** A single part entry in a CompleteMultipartUpload XML body. */
export const CompletePartSchema = z.object({
/** 1-based part number (1–10000 per S3 spec). */
partNumber: z.number().int().min(1).max(10000),
/** Part ETag as returned by UploadPart (quotes already stripped by the parser). */
etag: z.string().min(1),
});
/**
* S3 CompleteMultipartUpload body (`POST /{bucket}/{key}?uploadId=`).
*
* Validates the *parsed* output of `parseCompleteMultipartBody`
* (`interfaces/s3/xml.ts`).
*/
export const CompleteMultipartBodySchema = z.object({
/** Parts in the order submitted by the client. */
parts: z.array(CompletePartSchema),
});
/** Inferred complete-multipart body type. */
export type CompleteMultipartBody = z.infer<typeof CompleteMultipartBodySchema>;
/**
* Shared clamp for paginated S3 listing query params (`max-keys`,
* `max-uploads`, `max-parts`).
*
* Replaces four divergent inline clamps (ListObjectsV1 used `Math.max(1, …)`,
* V2/ListUploads/ListParts used bare `Math.min(…, 1000)` which admitted 0,
* negatives and NaN). Garbage input now falls back to the S3 default of 1000.
*
* @param raw - Raw query-param value (may be null when absent).
* @param fallback - Default when the value is missing or invalid (default 1000).
* @returns An integer in [1, 1000].
*/
export const clampMaxKeys = (raw: string | null, fallback = 1000): number => {
const parsed = z.coerce.number().int().min(1).max(1000).safeParse(raw);
if (parsed.success) return parsed.data;
if (raw === null) return fallback;
return 1000;
};
/**
* S3 part number from `?partNumber=` (UploadPart).
*
* Mirrors the M14 inline check in `handleUploadPart` (integer 1–10000).
*/
export const PartNumberSchema = z.coerce.number().int().min(1).max(10000);
/**
* Strictly positive integer coercion for numeric env config (e.g. `PORT`).
*
* Unlike the old `parseNumber` fallback in `src/env.ts` (garbage → silent
* default), invalid values fail so startup fails fast instead of running
* misconfigured.
*/
export const PositiveIntSchema = z.coerce.number().int().positive();
/**
* Parses unknown input with a zod schema, returning the typed value or
* `null` on failure. Use at transport boundaries where the caller maps
* failure to its own error shape (JSON 400 vs S3 XML error).
*
* @param schema - The zod schema to parse with.
* @param input - Untrusted input.
* @returns The parsed value, or `null` when invalid.
*/
export const parseOrNull = <T>(schema: z.ZodType<T>, input: unknown): T | null => {
const result = schema.safeParse(input);
return result.success ? result.data : null;
};
+17 -4
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@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@ mock.module('../src/interfaces/bot/handler', () => ({
startBot: mockStartBot,
}));
mock.module('../src/db/migrate', () => ({
mock.module('../src/infrastructure/persistence/drizzle/migrate', () => ({
runMigration: mock(() => Promise.resolve()),
}));
@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ mock.module('../src/interfaces/http/middleware/auth', () => ({
requireAuth: mockRequireAuth,
}));
mock.module('../src/utils/rateLimit', () => ({
mock.module('../src/interfaces/http/middleware/rate-limit', () => ({
cleanupRateLimitCache: mock(),
clearRateLimitCache: mock(),
checkRateLimit: mock(() => true),
@@ -128,8 +128,21 @@ describe('Bootstrap Server', () => {
expect(await res.json()).toEqual({ ok: true });
expect(mockHandleUpload).toHaveBeenCalledTimes(1);
const webApiRoute = serveCallArgs.routes?.['/api/v1/*'] as { GET: RouteHandler };
const protectedRes = await webApiRoute.GET(new Request('http://localhost/api/v1/files'));
// GET /api/v1/* is intentionally public (read endpoints need no auth) —
// it passes through to the raw handler (stubbed here to 404).
const webApiRoute = serveCallArgs.routes?.['/api/v1/*'] as {
GET: RouteHandler;
POST: RouteHandler;
};
const publicRes = await webApiRoute.GET(new Request('http://localhost/api/v1/files'));
expect(publicRes.status).toBe(404);
expect(await publicRes.json()).toEqual({ error: 'Not Found' });
// Write endpoints are auth-guarded — POST goes through requireAuth (401 here).
const protectedRes = await webApiRoute.POST(
new Request('http://localhost/api/v1/files', { method: 'POST' }),
);
expect(protectedRes.status).toBe(401);
expect(await protectedRes.json()).toEqual({ error: 'Unauthorized' });
-3
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@@ -7,9 +7,6 @@ import { ChunkedStorage } from '../src/infrastructure/telegram/chunked-storage';
* Tests the real ChunkedStorage class (src/infrastructure/telegram/
* chunked-storage.ts). uploadFileInTelegramChunks only depends on the injected
* telegramService, so we stub that and pass no-op repos for the rest.
*
* Rewritten from a stale test that imported the old `src/utils/chunked-storage`
* layout, which no longer exists after the refactor.
*/
const makeTelegramStub = (): ITelegramService =>
({
+1 -1
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@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ describe('Health Route Handler', () => {
expect(res.status).toBe(200);
const body = await res.json();
expect(body).toEqual({ status: 'ok' });
expect(body).toEqual({ status: 'ok', version: '1.2.2' });
expect(mockExecute).toHaveBeenCalled();
});
+170
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@@ -0,0 +1,170 @@
import { mock } from 'bun:test';
import type { ITelegramService } from '../../src/domain/ports/telegram-service';
/**
* Shared test doubles for the TeleUploader unit test suite.
*
* Consolidates the mock patterns that were previously copy-pasted across
* test files (`MockTelegraf` in bot-pool/bot/telegram tests, stub DI repos
* in upload/files tests, deterministic nanoid counters in upload tests).
*
* Rules:
* - Import from this module inside individual test files only — never as a
* global preload (avoids cross-file mock pollution; see CLAUDE.md).
* - Prefer `mock.module` with these factories over hand-rolled inline mocks
* so behavior stays consistent when the doubles evolve.
*
* @module test/helpers/test-doubles
*/
/** Minimal Telegram message result shape used by the MockTelegraf doubles. */
export interface MockTelegramMessage {
/** Telegram message identifier. */
message_id: number;
/** Document payload (present for document uploads). */
document?: { file_id: string; file_unique_id: string };
/** Photo payload (present for photo uploads). */
photo?: Array<{ file_id: string; file_unique_id: string }>;
}
/**
* Creates a Telegraf mock payload (`mock.module('telegraf', …)` factory).
*
* Mirrors the `MockTelegraf` pattern from `bot-pool.test.ts` / `bot.test.ts` /
* `telegram.test.ts` with controllable per-method implementations.
*
* @param overrides - Optional per-method implementations.
* @returns A `{ Telegraf }` module shape for `mock.module`.
*/
export const mockTelegrafModule = (overrides?: {
sendDocument?: (chatId: unknown, file: unknown, extra?: unknown) => Promise<MockTelegramMessage>;
sendPhoto?: (chatId: unknown, file: unknown, extra?: unknown) => Promise<MockTelegramMessage>;
getFile?: (fileId: string) => Promise<{ file_path?: string }>;
}) => {
const sendDocument =
overrides?.sendDocument ??
(async () => ({
message_id: 54321,
document: { file_id: 'document_id', file_unique_id: 'document_unique_id' },
}));
const sendPhoto =
overrides?.sendPhoto ??
(async () => ({
message_id: 12345,
photo: [
{ file_id: 'photo_id_low', file_unique_id: 'unique_id_low' },
{ file_id: 'photo_id_high', file_unique_id: 'unique_id_high' },
],
}));
const getFile = overrides?.getFile ?? (async () => ({ file_path: 'documents/file.dat' }));
return {
Telegraf: class {
token: unknown;
telegram: {
sendDocument: typeof sendDocument;
sendPhoto: typeof sendPhoto;
getFile: typeof getFile;
};
constructor(token: unknown) {
this.token = token;
this.telegram = { sendDocument, sendPhoto, getFile };
}
},
};
};
/**
* Creates a minimal {@link ITelegramService} stub backed by `bun:test` mocks.
*
* Mirrors the hand-rolled stub in `chunked-storage.test.ts` (real
* `ChunkedStorage` + stub telegram service + no-op repos).
*
* @param overrides - Optional per-method implementations.
* @returns An `ITelegramService` implementation whose methods are mocks.
*/
export const makeTelegramServiceStub = (
overrides?: Partial<ITelegramService>,
): ITelegramService & {
forwardToStorage: ReturnType<typeof mock>;
getFileInfo: ReturnType<typeof mock>;
} => {
const forwardToStorage = mock(
overrides?.forwardToStorage ??
(async (_bytes: unknown, fileName: string) => ({
telegramFileId: `tg-${fileName}`,
telegramFileUniqueId: `tg-unique-${fileName}`,
storageMessageId: 1,
})),
);
const getFileInfo = mock(
overrides?.getFileInfo ??
(async (telegramFileId: string) => ({
file_size: 100,
mime_type: 'application/octet-stream',
file_path: 'documents/file.dat',
bot_token: '123456:ABC-DEF',
telegramFileId,
})),
);
return {
forwardToStorage: forwardToStorage as unknown as ITelegramService['forwardToStorage'],
getFileInfo: getFileInfo as unknown as ITelegramService['getFileInfo'],
};
};
/**
* Creates a deterministic `nanoid` module mock — each call returns
* `prefix-1`, `prefix-2`, … instead of random IDs.
*
* Replaces the ad-hoc `mock.module('nanoid')` counters in `upload.test.ts`.
*
* @param prefix - Prefix for generated IDs (default `"test-id"`).
* @returns A `{ nanoid }` module shape for `mock.module`.
*/
export const mockNanoidModule = (prefix = 'test-id') => {
let counter = 0;
return {
nanoid: mock(() => `${prefix}-${++counter}`),
};
};
/**
* Builds a signed S3 test request with valid SigV4 headers.
*
* Request-signing is covered by `s3-auth.test.ts`; this helper exists for
* handler-level tests that mock `../src/interfaces/s3/auth` to accept any
* signature and only need a well-formed request object.
*
* @param url - Request URL (path-style `/bucket/key` or `/`).
* @param init - Optional `RequestInit` overrides (method defaults to GET).
* @returns A `Request` with stub SigV4 headers.
*/
export const s3TestRequest = (url: string, init?: RequestInit): Request =>
new Request(url, {
method: 'GET',
...init,
headers: {
authorization: 'AWS4-HMAC-SHA256 Credential=test/20260101/us-east-1/s3/aws4_request',
'x-amz-date': '20260101T000000Z',
'x-amz-content-sha256': 'UNSIGNED-PAYLOAD',
...(init?.headers ?? {}),
},
});
/** 1x1px JPEG fallback binary (offline-safe fixture, no network fetch). */
export const TINY_JPEG_HEX =
'ffd8ffe000104a46494600010101006000600000ffdb004300080606070605080707070909080a0c140d0c0b0b0c1912130f141d1a1f1e1d1a1c1c20242e2720222c231c1c2837292c30313434341f27393d38323c2e333432ffc0b000080100010101011100ffc4001f0000010501010110000000000000000000000102030405060708ffda000c03010002110311003f00a0ffd9';
/**
* Returns the tiny-JPEG fixture as a `Buffer` without any network access.
*
* Replaces the Wikimedia-fetch-with-fallback pattern in `telegram.test.ts`
* and `upload.test.ts` for tests that only need *some* valid image bytes.
* Tests that genuinely need a real PNG must stay in quarantine (see
* `test:quarantine` in package.json).
*
* @returns A 1x1px JPEG buffer.
*/
export const tinyJpegBuffer = (): Buffer => Buffer.from(TINY_JPEG_HEX, 'hex');
+89
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@@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
import { describe, expect, it } from 'bun:test';
import {
BucketNameSchema,
CompleteMultipartBodySchema,
clampMaxKeys,
DeleteObjectsBodySchema,
JsonUploadPayloadSchema,
LoginBodySchema,
parseOrNull,
} from '../src/shared/validation/schemas';
describe('BucketNameSchema (single canonical validator)', () => {
it('accepts valid bucket names', () => {
expect(BucketNameSchema.safeParse('gitea').success).toBe(true);
expect(BucketNameSchema.safeParse('my.bucket-01').success).toBe(true);
});
it('rejects invalid names (format, dots, IP, xn--)', () => {
expect(BucketNameSchema.safeParse('ab').success).toBe(false);
expect(BucketNameSchema.safeParse('UPPERCASE').success).toBe(false);
expect(BucketNameSchema.safeParse('a..b').success).toBe(false);
expect(BucketNameSchema.safeParse('192.168.1.1').success).toBe(false);
expect(BucketNameSchema.safeParse('xn--bcher-kva').success).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('JsonUploadPayloadSchema', () => {
it('accepts file + optional fileName', () => {
expect(
JsonUploadPayloadSchema.safeParse({ file: 'aGVsbG8=', fileName: 'hi.txt' }).success,
).toBe(true);
});
it('defaults fileName and rejects missing/empty file', () => {
const parsed = JsonUploadPayloadSchema.safeParse({ file: 'aGVsbG8=' });
expect(parsed.success && parsed.data.fileName).toBe('file');
expect(JsonUploadPayloadSchema.safeParse({}).success).toBe(false);
expect(JsonUploadPayloadSchema.safeParse({ file: '' }).success).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('LoginBodySchema', () => {
it('accepts a non-empty token and rejects the rest', () => {
expect(LoginBodySchema.safeParse({ token: 'secret' }).success).toBe(true);
expect(LoginBodySchema.safeParse({}).success).toBe(false);
expect(LoginBodySchema.safeParse({ token: '' }).success).toBe(false);
expect(LoginBodySchema.safeParse({ token: 42 }).success).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('DeleteObjectsBodySchema', () => {
it('accepts parsed keys and enforces the 1000-key S3 limit', () => {
expect(DeleteObjectsBodySchema.safeParse({ keys: ['a', 'b'], quiet: false }).success).toBe(
true,
);
expect(
DeleteObjectsBodySchema.safeParse({ keys: new Array(1001).fill('k'), quiet: true }).success,
).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('CompleteMultipartBodySchema', () => {
it('accepts parsed parts and rejects bad part numbers', () => {
expect(
CompleteMultipartBodySchema.safeParse({ parts: [{ partNumber: 1, etag: 'abc' }] }).success,
).toBe(true);
expect(
CompleteMultipartBodySchema.safeParse({ parts: [{ partNumber: 0, etag: 'abc' }] }).success,
).toBe(false);
});
});
describe('clampMaxKeys (unified listing clamp)', () => {
it('clamps into [1, 1000] and falls back to 1000 on garbage', () => {
expect(clampMaxKeys(null)).toBe(1000);
expect(clampMaxKeys('5')).toBe(5);
expect(clampMaxKeys('99999')).toBe(1000);
expect(clampMaxKeys('0')).toBe(1000);
expect(clampMaxKeys('-3')).toBe(1000);
expect(clampMaxKeys('abc')).toBe(1000);
});
});
describe('parseOrNull', () => {
it('returns the value on success and null on failure', () => {
expect(parseOrNull(LoginBodySchema, { token: 'x' })).toEqual({ token: 'x' });
expect(parseOrNull(LoginBodySchema, {})).toBeNull();
});
});